United States Navy aircraft carrier USS Cowpens (CVL-25)

 

USS Cowpens (CV-25/CVL-25/AVT-1), nicknamed The Mighty Moo, was an 11,000-ton Independence-class light aircraft carrier that served the United States Navy from 1943 to 1947.^[1]

Cowpens, named for the Battle of Cowpens of the Revolutionary War, was launched on 17 January 1943 at the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, in Camden, New Jersey, sponsored by Mrs. Margaret Bradford Spruance (née Halsey, daughter of Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey Jr.) and commissioned on 28 May 1943 by Captain R. P. McConnell. She was reclassified CVL-25 on 15 July 1943. Cowpens completed her active service at the end of 1946.^[2]

USS Cowpens (CVL 25) at the Pennsylvania Navial Yard 25th Jun 1943
USS Cowpens (CVL 25) taken by Naval Aircraft Factory Navy Yard Philadelphia Pennsylvania 25th Jun 1943

Description and construction

USS Cowpens (CVL-25): Detailed Overview The USS Cowpens (CVL-25), nicknamed “The Mighty Moo,” was an Independence-class light aircraft carrier that served with distinction during World War II. Originally laid down as the Cleveland-class light cruiser Huntington, it was converted to a carrier to address the Navy’s urgent need for more aviation platforms. Commissioned on May 28, 1943, the Cowpens earned 12 battle stars and a Navy Unit Commendation for its contributions to the Pacific Theater. Below is a detailed exploration of its features and operational upgrades.

Flight deck arrangements

The flight deck of the USS Cowpens was 622.5 feet long and 109 feet 2 inches wide at its maximum beam, allowing it to operate up to 45 aircraft. These typically included Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters and TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, which provided both offensive and defensive air capabilities. The deck layout was optimized for efficiency in launching and recovering aircraft, with one catapult to assist in takeoffs and arresting gear to ensure safe landings.

The hangar deck, positioned directly beneath the flight deck, was designed for aircraft storage, maintenance, and refueling. Two elevators facilitated the rapid movement of planes between the hangar and flight deck, enabling high sortie rates during combat operations. Throughout its service, minor adjustments were made to improve flight operations, such as enhanced deck lighting for limited night operations and the addition of safety features like extended crash barriers.

Propulsion

The USS Cowpens was powered by four Babcock & Wilcox boilers driving two General Electric steam turbines, which produced a total of 100,000 shaft horsepower. This propulsion system allowed the carrier to reach a top speed of 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph), making it one of the fastest ships of its class.

The ship’s range was approximately 13,000 nautical miles (24,000 kilometers) at a cruising speed of 15 knots, enabling it to participate in long-range operations across the vast Pacific Theater. The propulsion system proved reliable under the demanding conditions of extended combat deployments, ensuring the Cowpens could keep pace with larger fleet carriers and accompanying warships.

Armament

The original armament of the USS Cowpens included 26 Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and an array of Oerlikon 20 mm cannons. These weapons were strategically distributed across the ship to provide a comprehensive defensive umbrella against incoming enemy aircraft, a critical feature given the increased prevalence of kamikaze attacks as the war progressed.

Over time, the armament was upgraded to bolster its defensive capabilities. Additional Oerlikon cannons were installed, and some of the Bofors guns were fitted with improved fire control systems to enhance their accuracy and rate of fire. This allowed the Cowpens to provide effective anti-aircraft coverage for itself and other ships in the task force, as well as to repel enemy attacks during intense engagements.

Fire control and electronics

The USS Cowpens was equipped with state-of-the-art fire control and electronic systems for its time. Radar systems provided early detection of both aerial and surface threats, giving the crew vital seconds to prepare for incoming attacks or launch defensive measures. The ship’s air search radar enabled it to monitor a wide area for enemy aircraft, while surface search radar helped in navigation and fleet coordination.

The fire control systems were integrated with the ship’s anti-aircraft armament, allowing for radar-guided targeting. This increased the effectiveness of the Bofors and Oerlikon guns, particularly against fast-moving enemy aircraft. Communication systems on the Cowpens were continually upgraded during its service to improve coordination with other fleet units and enhance its role in carrier strike operations.

Armor

As with other Independence-class carriers, the USS Cowpens featured relatively light armor to maintain high speed and agility. The belt armor ranged from 1.5 to 5 inches in thickness, providing basic protection for critical areas such as the machinery spaces and ammunition magazines. The flight deck was not armored, but the main deck was reinforced with 3 inches of steel to protect vital systems below.

This limited armor protection made the carrier vulnerable to direct hits from bombs and torpedoes, a compromise made to ensure it could achieve the speeds and operational flexibility required in a fast-moving carrier task force. To mitigate this vulnerability, the Cowpens relied on its escorts, air group, and advanced detection systems to avoid or intercept threats before they could inflict damage.

The USS Cowpens played a vital role in numerous campaigns, including the Mariana Islands, the Philippines, and Okinawa. Its blend of speed, firepower, and versatility made it a key asset in the U.S. Navy’s efforts to gain air and sea superiority in the Pacific. Despite its light armor and compact size, the Cowpens demonstrated remarkable effectiveness as part of carrier strike operations, solidifying its place in naval history.

Service history - World War II

1943

Departing Philadelphia, on 29th August 1943, Cowpens arrived at Pearl Harbor on 19th September 1943, to begin the active and distinguished war career which was to earn her a Navy Unit Commendation. She sailed with Task Force 14 for the strike on Wake Island on 5–6 October, then returned to Pearl Harbor to prepare for strikes on the Marshall Islands preliminary to invasion. The ship was slightly damaged on 18th October 1943 in a collision with the destroyer USS Abbot (DD-629) while patrolling near Hawaii. Abbot was much more heavily damaged, requiring three months to repair at Pearl Harbor. Cowpens sortied from Pearl Harbor 10th November to launch air strikes on Mille and Makin atolls from 19th to 24th November, and Kwajalein and Wotje on 4th December 1943, returning to her base on 9th December 1943.^[3]

 Japanese occupation of the Gilbert Islands

On the same day as the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded the Gilbert Islands, occupying 3 of them by 9 December 1941.

On 17 August 1942, 221 U.S. Marines of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion raided Makin from two submarines. The raid was intended by the Americans to confuse the Japanese about US intentions in the Pacific, a feint to draw Japanese attention away from the planned invasion route through the Solomons. It is instead believed to have alerted the Japanese to the strategic importance of the Gilbert Islands and led to their reinforcement and fortification. Marines captured during this operation were subsequently summarily executed by the Japanese, in gross violation of the laws of war. The 19 Marines who died were left behind for the villagers to bury. In 1999, a Marine Honor guard was sent to recover the bodies and found them after a villager showed them where to dig. All were exhumed and were taken to the United States.

Tarawa and Abemama were occupied in force by the Japanese in September 1942 and during the next year garrisons were built up on Betio (Tarawa Atoll), and Butaritari (Makin Atoll). Only nominal forces were placed on other islands in the Gilberts.

On 20th November 1943, the U.S. Army and U.S. 2nd Marine Division landed on Makin and Tarawa, initiating the battles of Makin and Tarawa, in which the Japanese were defeated. The Gilbert Islands were then used to support the invasion of the Marshall Islands in February 1944. The US built bases on Islands.

 

USS Cowpens (CVL 25) Gilberts Operation 24th Nov 1943
USS Cowpens (CVL 25) Gilbert Islands Operations 24th Nov 1943

 

USS Cowpens (CVL 25) Gilberts Operation 24th Nov 1943
Burning F6F-3 Hellcat White 3 BulNo 66101 flown by Alfred W Magee Gilberts Ops 24th Nov 1943

1944

USS Cowpens (CVL 25) during raids on the Marshall Islands Jan 1944
USS South Dakota (BB 57) near USS Cowpens (CVL 25) during raids on the Marshall Islands Jan 1944

 

Joining Task Force 58, Cowpens sailed from Pearl Harbor on 16 January 1944 for the invasion of the Marshalls. Her planes pounded Kwajalein and Eniwetok the last three days of the month to prepare for the assault landing on 31 January. Using Majuro as a base, the force struck at Truk on 16–17 February and the Mariana Islands on 21–22 February before putting into Pearl Harbor on 4 March. Returning to Majuro, Task Force 58 based here for attacks on the western Carolines; Cowpens supplied air and antisubmarine patrols during the raids on Palau, Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai from 30 March to 1 April. After operating off New Guinea during the invasion of Hollandia from 21 to 28 April, Cowpens took part in the strikes on Truk, Satawan and Ponape from 29 April to 1 May, returning to Majuro on 14 May for training.^[4]

From 6 June to 10 July 1944, Cowpens operated in the Marianas operation. Her planes struck the island of Saipan to aid the assault troops, and made supporting raids on Iwo Jima, Pagan Island, Rota, and Guam. They also took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea on 19–20 June, accounting for a number of the huge tally of enemy planes downed. After a brief overhaul at Pearl Harbor, Cowpens rejoined the fast carrier task force at Eniwetok on 17 August. Then, on 29 August, she sailed for the pre-invasion strikes on the Palaus, whose assault was an essential preliminary for the return to the Philippines. From 13 to 17 September, she was detached from the force to cover the landings on Morotai, then rejoined it for sweep, patrol, and attack missions against Luzon from 21 to 24 September.^[5]

Cowpens, with her task group, sent air strikes to neutralize Japanese bases on Okinawa and Formosa from 10th to 14th October 1944, and when Canberra and Houston were hit by torpedoes, Cowpens provided air cover for their safe withdrawal, rejoining her task group on 20 October. En route to Ulithi, she was recalled when the Japanese Fleet threatened the Leyte invasion, and during the Battle of Surigao Strait phase of the decisive Battle for Leyte Gulf on 25–26 October, provided combat air patrol for the ships pursuing the fleeing remnant of the Japanese fleet. Continuing her support of the Philippines advance, Cowpens' planes struck Luzon repeatedly during December. During the disastrous Typhoon Cobra on 18 December, Cowpens lost a man: ship's air officer Lieutenant Commander Robert Price, several planes, and some equipment, but skillful work by her crew prevented major damage, and she reached Ulithi safely on 21st December 1944 to repair her storm damage.^[6]

Typhoon Cobra

14th to 19th December 1944

 USS Cowpens (CVL 25) Typhoon Cobra hit the Third Fleet on 18th Dec 1944

During Typhoon Cobra in 14th to 19th December 1944, a total of nine U.S. Navy ships sustained significant damage due to the severe storm conditions. The typhoon, which struck the Third Fleet in the Philippine Sea, caused extreme waves and winds that battered many vessels in the fleet, in addition to sinking three destroyers: USS Hull (DD-350); USS Monaghan (DD-354); USS Spence (DD-512) and caused the death of 790 sailors.

USS Hull (DD-350) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944
USS Hull (DD-350) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944

USS Monaghan (DD-354) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944
USS Hull (DD-350) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944.

USS Spence (DD-512) sank due to Typhoon Cobra December 1944

USS Spence (DD-512) which was one of three destroyers which capsized and sank due to the intense weather conditions of Typhoon Cobra in December 1944.

USS Hull (DD-350) - USS Monaghan (DD-354) - USS Spence (DD-512)

These destroyers capsized and sank due to the intense conditions, and 790 sailors lost their lives in the disaster.

Other ships damaged during Typhoon Cobra

Aircraft Carriers: The storm caused substantial damage to several carriers, including the USS Monterey (CVL-26), which suffered a severe onboard fire that was difficult to control. Future U.S. President Gerald Ford, serving as a young officer, helped to contain the blaze. Other carriers, such as USS Cowpens (CVL-25), USS San Jacinto (CVL-30), and USS Altamaha (CVE-18), were also damaged.

USS Massachusetts (BB-59) was damaged by Typhoon Cobra December 1944
The battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), among others, sustained structural damage from the waves and heavy rolling conditions.

Battleships: The battleship USS Massachusetts (BB-59), among others, sustained structural damage from the waves and heavy rolling.

Cruisers and Destroyers: Several cruisers and destroyers suffered structural damage, fuel loss, and equipment failures. Some destroyers reported near-capsize events, with USS Dewey (DD-349) and USS Aylwin (DD-355) narrowly avoiding the same fate as the three lost destroyers.

In total, over 100 aircraft were lost on various carriers, washed overboard or damaged beyond repair due to the severe weather. The disaster led to significant changes in Navy weather forecasting, safety protocols, and training to prevent similar incidents in the future.

USS Langley (CVL 27) rolling sharply as she rides out Typhoon Cobra from USS Essex (CV-9) 13th Jan 1945
USS Langley (CVL 27) rolling sharply as she rides out Typhoon Cobra from USS Essex (CV-9) 13th Jan 1945

On 18 December 1944, elements of Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet plowed into a powerful Pacific Typhoon east of the Philippines. By the time the tropical cyclone passed, three U.S. destroyers had been sunk, Spence (DD-512), Hull (DD-350) and Monaghan (DD-354) with 775 of their crewmen lost and only 91 rescued. The light carrier Monterey (CVL-26) suffered a serious fire during the storm, losing three crewmen and 18 aircraft. Total casualties across the entire force, including the three destroyers, included 790 killed and 146 planes smashed, washed overboard, or jettisoned. Twenty-seven ships were damaged, eleven requiring major repairs, including Monterey.

Following the Battle of Leyte Gulf on 24–25 October, the Third Fleet Fast Carrier Task Force (TF-38) was essentially tied down providing air cover to Leyte as the U.S. Army Air Force was unable to get onto airfields on Leyte and provide their own air-cover to troops ashore, primarily due to abysmal whether that rendered all but the airfield at Tacloban unusable due to mud. (Tacloban had very limited capacity even under ordinary circumstances.) As a result, rather than roaming the Western Pacific, Halsey’s carriers were subject to increasing Japanese kamikaze attacks while tied down off the eastern Philippines. (Actually, more U.S. ships would by sunk, put out of action, or damaged, and with more casualties in the two months it took the Army to secure Leyte, than during the Battle of Leyte Gulf itself, which will be the subject of the next H-gram.) Nevertheless, TF-38 stood in there and kept pounding Japanese airfields with airstrikes and fighter sweeps throughout the Philippines but especially on the main island of Luzon, which MacArthur had originally slated for invasion in mid-December. Halsey’s carriers were conducting operations in support of this planned invasion (which would be postponed until January 1945, but that was not known yet) when the weather began seriously to deteriorate on 16 December, gravely impacting at-sea refueling operations. Many of Halsey’s ships were low on fuel due to the continuous high-tempo combat operations

As of 17 December 1944, TF-38 consisted of seven Essex-class fleet carriers, six Independence-class light carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, eleven light cruisers and about 50 destroyers. TF-38 was joining with the Third Fleet refueling group that consisted of twelve fleet oilers, three fleet tugs, five destroyers, ten destroyer escorts, and five escort carriers with replacement planes.

With the technology of the time, there was little capability to track typhoons, and avoiding them depended greatly on the “Seaman’s Weather Eye.” The problem with this typhoon was that although it was very powerful, it was very compact and not very big, so warning signs were not apparent until the typhoon was very close, much closer than expected. Initially, as the weather rapidly deteriorated on 17 December, there were no signs that a typhoon was approaching, and the weather forecasters on the Third Fleet staff and on the carriers repeatedly misdiagnosed the situation. As seas built on the morning of the 17th, refueling became increasingly hazardous, with cases of parted hoses and lines and several near-collisions.

At 1251, Halsey gave orders to belay fueling. Halsey also gave orders for ships that had not been able to refuel to ballast down with salt water. However, several ships delayed too long in doing so in hopes that they would be able to take fuel as soon as the seas subsided. Vice Admiral John McCain, Commander of CTF-38, followed Halsey’s order, except for those orders pertaining to the destroyers Spence, Hickox (DD-673) and Maddox (DD-731) which were so low on fuel (10–15%) that they might not make it 24 hours. The Spence and Hickox were ordered to remain with the oilers and grab fuel if the seas allowed. As a result, the three destroyers delayed ballasting down, in the case of Spence too long, which would prove fatal.

Several attempts by Halsey to maneuver the fleet to areas more conducive to refueling put parts of the fleet directly in the path of the storm, unfortunately. For a time, the fleet was on the same course as the storm but slightly ahead and faster, which gave a misleading impression that conditions were slowly improving. It wasn’t until about 0400 on the 18th that it became apparent that the fleet had stumbled into a very serious weather condition. It wasn’t until about 1000 that the barometer started falling precipitously in a manner indicative of an approaching typhoon and not just a bad weather front. By 1400 the wind reached hurricane strength, and several of the carriers were so close that they could see the eye of the typhoon on radar.

In the end, a number of ships ultimately wound up in the most dangerous quadrant, with some passing right through the eye on 18 December. Halsey’s biggest mistake was waiting too long to give individual ships the okay to break out of formation to ride out the storm independently, giving the order only at 1149 (although some commanding officers were already doing so on their own initiative). Others who tried too long to stay in formation caused their ships to take an even worse beating than necessary. At 1314, Halsey issued a typhoon warning, the first official traffic referencing a typhoon. By this time, three of Halsey’s destroyers had already gone down, and others were fighting to survive.

The poor sea-keeping qualities of the Independence-class light carriers (which had been hastily designed and built on light cruiser hulls) became readily apparent by 0900 on 18 December. All were rolling severely. Langley (CVL-27) rolled 70-degrees at one point. Seven planes on Cowpens (CVL-25) were washed overboard and one plane that broke loose started a fire that was quickly extinguished. On San Jacinto (CVL-30), a fighter plane broke loose on the hangar deck and smashed seven other aircraft. By contrast, the escort carriers, with their hull design based on merchant ships, actually fared better than the light carriers, suffering less damage, although about 90 of the replacement aircraft were lost.

The light carrier Monterey (CVL-26) fared the worst, as a plane broke free on the hangar deck and smashed into a bulkhead at 0911, starting a serious fire, that was put out only after three sailors were killed and many more injured, with 18 planes destroyed by fire or washed overboard and another 16 planes seriously damaged as they careened about the hangar bay during severe rolls, exacerbated by the fact that Monterey also lost steerageway when the boiler rooms were evacuated shortly after the fire started. Of note, future President Lieutenant Gerald R. Ford was serving as the General Quarters Officer of the Deck. With Captain Stuart H. Ingersoll on the bridge, Ford was ordered to go down to the hangar deck and report on the fire, noting later that he was nearly washed overboard while planes were smashing into each other. Fortunately, the crew got the fire and the planes under control along with steerage, and Monterey weathered the typhoon, although she required repairs at Bremerton until April 1945.

Spence (DD-512) was a new Fletcher-class destroyer, much more stable than the older Farragut-class, but she was in trouble even before the typhoon hit, with her fuel state down to 15%, which meant she had less than 24 hours’ steaming time at eight knots. After unsuccessfully attempting to refuel from battleship New Jersey (BB-62) on the 17th, she was then ordered to accompany the oiler group to refuel at the first chance, which never came. Her skipper began water-ballasting too late and she began rolling heavily to port. Water entered through the ventilators and short-circuited the distribution board. Then the rudder jammed hard right. At 1110, Spence took a deep roll to port, recovered, and then took another one from which she did not recover, going down with 317 of her crew (23 survived), the first destroyer to sink in the typhoon.

By 1100 the destroyer Hull (DD-350), commanded by Lieutenant Commander J.A. Marks, was in serious trouble. Marks was responsible for screening a group of four oilers and maintained station for too long. Hull was at 70% fuel state and had not taken on saltwater ballast in the tanks. (The Court of Inquiry determined that standard procedures at the time did not require re-ballasting with that much fuel on board, but the failure to do so nonetheless contributed to her loss. Although regulations didn’t require it, re-ballasting was a lesson from an earlier typhoon that had not been learned.) In addition, as an older Farragut-class destroyer, Hull had over 500 tons of extra weapons and equipment added, making her top heavy. By 1100 the wind had reached 100 knots, and Hull was rolling 50 degrees, which just before noon reached 70 degrees. She survived several such rolls before a gust of wind estimated at 110 knots pinned her on her beam ends, and water poured down her funnels and into the pilothouse and she capsized and sank a few minutes after noon with 202 of her crew (62 survived.)

The Farragut-class destroyer Dewey (DD-349) almost met the same fate as Hull, but was saved by the prompt jettisoning of topside weights, re-ballasting with salt water, and the loss of her funnel, which reduced sail area, along with a lot of bailing and pumping. Farragut-class Aylwin (DD-355) also barely survived as she passed very close to the eye wall. By 1100, Aylwin had lost her engines and steering control, rolled 70 degrees to port and stayed there for 20 minutes. Regaining steering control intermittently, Lieutenant Commander W. K. Rogers, through some incredible ship handling was able to hold her up, but temperatures in the engine rooms reached 180 degrees as the blowers failed and the engine rooms had to be evacuated. The ship’s engineering officer, Lieutenant E. R. Rendahl and Machinist’s Mate T. Sarenski remained at their posts despite the intense heat in order to protect the electrical circuits. When they too finally evacuated, they had to take off their life jackets to fit through the escape hatch to the deck, where they collapsed due to the temperature change and were washed overboard. Somehow, Aylwin managed to survive despite serious flooding.

Farragut-class destroyer Monaghan (DD-354) was not so lucky as Dewey and Aylwin. Her fuel tanks were 76 percent full, and although she attempted to ballast down, with great difficulty as valves stuck, it was too late. At 1130, Monaghan lost electric power and the steering engine failed. After several very heavy rolls she foundered just before noon along with 256 of her crew (only six survived). Monaghan had 12 battle stars, having sunk a Japanese midget submarine inside Pearl Harbor during the air attack, served at Midway, performed valiantly in the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, drove the Japanese submarine I-7 onto the rocks in the Aleutians and fought in other battles, but she was defeated by a storm.

By the time the typhoon moved through, numerous ships had been damaged. Those that required major repair included Anzio (CVE-57), Cape Esperance (CVE-88), Baltimore (CA-68), Miami (CL-89), Dewey (DD-349), Aylwin (DD-355), Buchanan (DD-484), Dyson (DD-572), Hickox (DD-673), Benham (DD-796), Donaldson (DE-44), and Melvin R. Nawman (DE-416.) Other ships damaged included four light carriers, three escort carriers, one battleship, one destroyer, two destroyer escorts, and an oiler.

A hero of the Typhoon was the destroyer escort Tabberer (DE-418), which had her foremast and radio antennas washed away, and was taking 60 degree rolls. As evening approached on the 18th, Tabberer encountered and rescued a survivor of Hull. At that point her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Henry L. Plage, commenced a box search, despite her own serious state. Over the next 51 hours, Plage didn’t receive (or ignored) repeated orders from Admiral Halsey for all ships to regroup at Ulithi. (Halsey did not learn that any of his ships had been sunk until 0225 on 19 December.) During this period, Tabberer rescued 55 survivors (41 from Hull and 14 from Spence) before being relieved by two destroyer escorts. Tabberer rescued ten of the Hull survivors at night. Many were rescued by Hull swimmers, who went over overboard with lines tied, in order to bring the survivors to nets and life rings on Tabberer’s side, while other crewmen used rifle fire to drive away sharks. Lieutenant Commander Plage was awarded a Legion of Merit and Tabberer a Navy Unit Commendation (the first ever awarded, although others were awarded retroactively for earlier actions). The destroyer Brown (DD-546) rescued the six survivors from Monaghan and 13 survivors of Hull. All told, 93 crewmen who had been washed overboard or survived the sinking of their ships were rescued.

A Court of Inquiry subsequently convened at Ulithi on 26 December 1944 aboard the destroyer tender Cascade (AD-16), with Admiral Chester A. Nimitz in attendance and presided by Vice Admiral John Hoover. The Court of Inquiry placed responsibility for losses and storm damage on Admiral Halsey but ascribed no negligence, stating that Halsey’s mistakes “were errors in judgment committed under stress of war operations and stemming from a commendable desire to meet military requirements.” In retrospect, Halsey should not have attempted any refueling operations on the morning of 18 December, but that would have required him to know where the center of the typhoon was before he did. The Court of Inquiry also determined that the commanding officers of Hull, Monaghan, and Spence maneuvered too long in an attempt to keep station, which “prevented them from concentrating early enough on saving their ships.” In the opinion of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, it was “too much to expect of junior destroyer skippers-classes of 1937 and 1938, Naval Academy-to have pitted their brief experience against the lack of typhoon warnings and their own want of fuel.”

However, in the words of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, “The time for taking all measures for a ship’s safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.”

Sources are: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 13: The Liberation of the Philippines, by Samuel Eliot Morison; and the Dictionary of American Fighting Ships (DANFS).

1945

USS Cowpens in 1945

From 30 December 1944 to 26 January 1945, Cowpens was at sea for the Lingayen Gulf landings. Her planes struck targets on Formosa, Luzon, the Indochinese coast and the Hong Kong-Canton area and Okinawa during January. On 10 February, Cowpens sortied from Ulithi for the Iwo Jima operation, striking the Tokyo area, supporting the initial landings from 19 to 22 February, and hitting Okinawa on 1 March.^[7]

USS Cowpens (CVL 25) at the Mare Island Navy Yard 15th May 1945
USS Cowpens (CVL 25) at the Mare Island Navy Yard 15th May 1945

On 13 June, following an overhaul at San Francisco and training at Pearl Harbor, Cowpens sailed on for San Pedro Bay, Leyte. Along the way she struck Wake Island on 20 June. Rejoining Task Force 58, Cowpens sailed from San Pedro Bay on 1 July to join in the final raids on the Japanese mainland. Her planes pounded Tokyo, Kure, and other cities of Hokkaidō and Honshū until 15 August. Cowpens was the first American carrier to enter Tokyo Harbor. Remaining off Tokyo Bay until the occupation landings began on 30 August, Cowpens launched photographic reconnaissance missions to patrol airfields and shipping movements, and to locate and supply prisoner-of-war camps. Men from Cowpens were the first Americans to set foot on the Japanese mainland, and were largely responsible for the emergency activation of Yokosuka airfield for Allied use and the liberation of a POW camp near Niigata. From 8 November 1945 to 28 January 1946 Cowpens made two voyages to Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Okinawa to return veterans on 'Magic Carpet' runs.^[8]

Post-war

On 3 December 1946, Cowpens was placed in commission reserve at Mare Island. On 15 May 1959, she was reclassified as an aircraft transport, with a new hull number, AVT-1. Then, on 1 November, she was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register and sold for scrap.^[9]

Awards

In addition to her Navy Unit Commendation, Cowpens received 12 battle stars for World War II service.

Commemoration

Each year, the town of Cowpens, South Carolina, holds a 4-day festival honoring veterans of Cowpens. 'The Mighty Moo Festival' was first held in 1977, with one crewmember of CVL-25 attending. Since then, as many as 115 CVL-25 veterans have attended the festival at once. Also, since the launch and commissioning of the USS Cowpens (CG-63) in 1991, the festival has included actively serving crewmen or women of CG-63 sent by the ship's commanding officer, as well as previously serving veterans of CG 63. The festival is held from Wednesday through Saturday preceding Father's Day each June. During the 1980s, the town of Cowpens, South Carolina, actively petitioned Congress to name another ship Cowpens, which may have played a direct role in choosing this name for CG-63.