Battle of El Guettar part of Tunisia Campaign
Date: March 23 - April 7, 1943
Location: El Guettar, Tunisia
Result: US victory
Belligerents: United States - Nazi Germany and Italy
Commanders and leaders:
United States Army General George Patton
Axis Forces: Nazi Germany Jürgen von Arnim and Italy Giovanni Messe
Casualties and losses:
USA: 35-55 tanks lost 4,000-5,000 killed or wounded
Axis Forces: 40+ tanks lost 4,000-6,000 killed or wounded in 3 weeks
The Battle of El Guettar was a World War II battle that took place during the Tunisia Campaign, fought between elements of the Army Group Afrika under Jürgen von Arnim and U.S. II Corps under Major General George Patton in south-central Tunisia. It was the first battle in which U.S. forces were able to defeat the experienced German tank units, but the followup to the battle was inconclusive.
U.S. II Corps had been badly mauled in their first encounter with the German-Italian forces in Tunisia in a series of battles that culminated in the disastrous Battle of the Kasserine Pass in late February 1943. Erwin Rommel, poised on the threshold of a complete tactical victory, turned from the battle to return to his eastward-facing defenses at the Mareth Line when he heard of the approach of Bernard Montgomery's British 8th Army. Thus the battle concluded with the U.S. forces still in the field, but having lost ground and men, and with little confidence in some key commanders.
The American command reacted to their failure against the German forces with a prompt and sweeping series of changes in command, discipline, and tactics. A major change was the adoption of more flexible artillery communications, allowing all batteries within range of a target to respond to a single call for fire. Previously each battery could fire only on the direct command of its dedicated observers, spread out over the lines and using different frequencies to communicate back to the battery. Also, large units were kept massed rather than being broken up into smaller, unsupported elements as had been done under Fredendall. Coordination with air support was improved but did not reach satisfactory levels until later in the war.
On 6 March 1943, George Patton took command of the U.S. II Corps from Lloyd Fredendall, who had been in command before and during the Kasserine engagement. His first move was to organize his U.S. II Corps for an offensive back toward the Eastern Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains. This, if successful, would threaten the right rear of the Axis forces defending the Mareth Line facing Montgomery's 8th Army and ultimately make their position untenable.
On 17 March the U.S. 1st Infantry Division moved forward into the almost abandoned plains, taking the town of Gafsa and starting to set it up as a forward supply base for further operations. On the 18th the 1st Ranger Battalion led by Colonel William O. Darby pushed ahead, and occupied the oasis of El Guettar, again meeting with little opposition. The Italian defenders instead retreated and took up positions in the hills overlooking the town, thereby closing the mountain pass (of the same name) leading south out of the interior plains to the coastal plain. Another operation by the Rangers took one of the Italian positions and 700 prisoners on the night of 20 March, after scaling a sheer cliff and passing ammunition and equipment up hand-over-hand. They were now in an excellent position for an offensive.
The Axis army commanders had become aware of the U.S. movements and decided that the 10th Panzer Division should settle them. Rommel had flown to Germany before the battle, leaving von Arnim in control of the newly-named Army Group Africa. Von Arnim held Rommel's opinion on the low quality of the U.S. forces and felt that a show of force would be enough to clear them from the Eastern Dorsals again.
At 06:00 on 23 March, fifty tanks of Broich's 10th Panzer emerged from the pass into the El Guettar valley at 34°20′12″N 8°56′53″E / 34.33667°N 8.94806°E / 34.33667; 8.94806, followed by Marder tank destroyers and panzergrenadiers. The Germans quickly overran front line infantry and artillery positions. Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen, Sr., commanding U.S. 1st Infantry Division, was threatened when two tanks came near his headquarters, but he shrugged off suggestions of moving, "I will like hell pull out, and I'll shoot the first bastard who does."
German efforts took a turn for the worse when they ran into a minefield. When they slowed to clear the field, U.S. artillery and anti-tank guns opened up on them, including 31 potent M10 tank destroyers which had recently arrived. Over the next hour, 30 of the 10th Panzer's tanks were destroyed, and by 09:00 they retreated from the valley.
A second attempt was made starting at 16:45, after waiting for the infantry to form up. Once again the U.S. artillery was able to seriously disorganize the attack, eventually breaking the charge and inflicting heavy losses. Realizing that further attacks were hopeless, the rest of the 10th dug in on hills to the east or retreated back to German HQ at Gabès.
On 19 March, the British 8th Army launched their attack on the Mareth Line, at first with little success. However, on 26 March, a force sent via an outflanking inland route arrived to the north of the line, and the Mareth defenses became untenable. A full retreat started to a new line set up at Wadi Akarit, north of Gabès at 33°53′3″N 10°5′33″E / 33.88417°N 10.0925°E / 33.88417; 10.0925. This made the U.S. position even more valuable, since the road through El Guettar led directly into Gabès.
Over the next week the U.S. forces slowly moved forward to take the rest of the interior plains and set up lines across the entire Eastern Dorsals. German defenses were heavy, and the progress was both slow and costly. However by 30 March they were in position for an offensive south from El Guettar. In order to start a breakout, the two original Italian strongpoints on Hill 369 34°14′29″N 9°7′16″E / 34.24139°N 9.12111°E / 34.24139; 9.12111 (Hill 369) and Hill 772 34°12′7″N 8°59′36″E / 34.20194°N 8.99333°E / 34.20194; 8.99333 (Hill 772) had to be taken, one after the other.
The U.S. plan involved the U.S. 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, and one "Combat Command" (1/3rd) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, collectively known as "Benson Force". This force attacked Hill 369 on the afternoon of 30 March but ran into mines and anti-tank fire, losing 5 tanks. The tanks were removed, and the 1st and 9th attacked again the next day at 06:00, moving up and taking several hundred prisoners. However an Italian counterattack drove them back from their newly gained positions, and by 12:45 they were back where they started with the loss of 9 tanks and 2 tank destroyers. A further attempt the next day on 1 April also failed, after barely getting started.
At this point Patton received orders to start the attempt on Hill 772, even though Hill 369 was still under Italian control. The 9th was moved to Hill 772, leaving the 1st on Hill 369. By 3 April, the 1st had finally cleared Hill 369, but the battle on Hill 772 continued. The Italian commander, General Messe, then called in support from the German 21st Panzer Division, further slowing progress. The tempo of the operations then slowed, and the lines remained largely static.
On 6 April, the British 8th Army once again overran the German lines, and a full retreat started. On the morning of 7 April, Benson Force moved through the positions held by the 1st and 9th, and raced down the abandoned El Guettar-Gabès road, where it met the lead elements of the 8th Army at 17:00.
With the last Axis line of defense in the south of Tunisia broken, they made a run to join the other Axis forces in the north. Tunisia fell to the Allies in early May.
The results of the El Guettar operations were mixed. The U.S. showed they were able to fight the Germans successfully in a defensive operation during the opening stages but also demonstrated a lack of power when starting offensive operations of their own.
* The battle is portrayed in a lengthy scene in the 1970 biographical film Patton.
* Anderson, Charles R. (1993). Tunisia 17 November 1942 to 13 May 1943. U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II. United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-12. ISBN 0-16-038106-1. http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/tunisia/tunisia.htm.
* Atkinson, Rick (2002). An Army at Dawn: the War in North Africa, 1942-1943. New York: Henry Holt & Co.. ISBN 0805062882.
* Howe, G. F. (1957). Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. Washington: Department of the Army.
* The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, "Old Ironsides.". Washington: Combat Forces Press. 1954.
* Kelly, Orr (2002). Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. New York: Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0471414292.
* King, Michael J. (1985). Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II. US Army Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College.
* Levine, Alan (1999). The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0275965211.
* Middleton, Drew (20 March 1943). "US Force at Pass". New York Times.
* Moorhead, Alan (1968). The March to Tunis: The North African War, 1940-1943. New York: Dell Publishing.
* Wickware, F. G. (1944). The American Yearbook. New York: Nelson.
Web Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_El_Guettar
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