IL2

Messerschmitt Bf-109E JG27.2 Libya 1941 01

Photo 01: A Bf-109E-7 Trop of 2./JG27 scrambles from Gazala, Summer 1941.

Messerschmitt Bf-109E JG27.2 El Gazala, North Africa 1941 01-02

Photo’s 01-02: Ground personnel I working on the DB601N engine of a Bf-109E-7 Trop. By May 1941, I./JG27 had succeeded in transporting its ground elements to Mrica, but the ground staff of 11. Gruppe were greatly delayed due to the lack of transport space available to move I them from Italy to North Mrica. In early November 1941, when 1. and II./JG27 were based on the same aerodromes at Gazala and Gambut, it was relatively easy for the ground staff (Stabskompanie) of 1. Gruppe to support the aircraft of II. Gruppe as the campaign was static, but when the Allies launched their Crusader offensive on 18 November 1941, the situation became more difficult, particularly as the flying elements of an additional Gruppe, III./JG27, were shortly to arrive in Mrica. By the end of March 1942, i.e. five months after the flying elements of I. and II./JG27 had become fully operational in Africa, the two Gruppen should have received about 1,200 ground personnel and about 400 vehicles on their establishment but, in act, had received only about 110 ground personnel and none of the units motor transport had been sent to support them. The process of transporting ground staff was much speeded up from April 1942 onwards, but the general shortage of motor transport for the Luftwaffe in Mrica had far-reaching consequences, particularly once the campaign developed into one of movement. Indeed, during this phase, 4./JG27 had to carry out the evacuation of flying elements, equipment and 50 ground staff with only two 4-ton lorries, 3 cars, a petrol bowser and a motor cycle. On 24 June 1942, during the German advance to El Alamein, Fliegerfiihrer Mrika had only sufficient motor transport to move two fighter Gruppen forward to Sidi Barrani to support Rommel without borrowing from an already short Panzer Army. Eventually, Kesselring was obliged to point out to Rommel that inadequate serviceability, inadequate supplies, and therefore inadequate support for the Panzer Army could all be traced back to the lack of motor transport.