IL2

  Luftwaffe Fighter-Bombers and Destroyers

"From 1938 onwards, the Luftwaffe had developed the Me-110 twin engined fighter; called the ‘heavy’ or ‘destroyer’ fighter (Zerstörer). The role of this fighter was theoretically to be the pursuit of enemy formations operating over the Reich or returning over their own territory. In point of fact many squadrons of these aircraft were employed in the early war campaign. The twin-engine fighter was something new in German pre-war concepts, and in the Staff College lectures its experimental nature was constantly emphasized.”

 

From The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945 issued by the Air Ministry (A.C.A.S.[1].1948)

 

The twin-engined heavy fighter: concept and development.

The genesis of the Messerschmitt 110 evolved out of a requirement of the German Air Ministry in the early months of 1934 for a twin-engined heavy fighter, which would be given the name 'Zerstörer ', literally 'Destroyer', which could cleave a path ahead of bomber formations, and that could also carry out the role of strategic reconnaissance and bomber. By June 1934 the project had been put out to tender to Arado, Dornier , Focke-Wulf, Heinkel, Henschel and Bayerische Flugzeugwerke (Messerschmitt). The timetable issued to these companies specified that the mock-ups were to be ready by February 1935, and the first aircraft by February 1936. Following on swiftly from the issue of the tender, in July 1934 the Air Ministry issued contracts to Focke-Wulf, Henschel and Bayerische Flugzeugwerke for the development of the Zerstörer concept, along with the Erprobungsstelle (Test Centre for the Luftwaffe), the latter undertaking a multiplicity of tasks in the testing of all aspects of development of the model. Competition for the Bf-110 would come in the form of the Fw 157 and Hs 124.

 

The Air Ministry's further requirement for a high-speed bomber in the spring of 1935 resulted in the Bf-110Gravitating towards a pure 'Zerstörer ' concept. As a result, the inadequacies of the other two designs led inexorably to the Bf-110Being the favoured design for the 'Zerstörer ' role. By November 1935, this was confirmed. The Air Ministry also took the view at this time that the Bf-110 mock-up lent itself to a bomber configuration. This clearly shows that even before the maiden test flight of the Bf-110, Luftwaffe thinking had envisaged the aircraft not only as a machine that would clear a path for bomber formations, but which would also undertake duties as a ground-attack aircraft in support of German ground forces. It was also at this time that the Air Ministry unequivocally stated that the term 'Bf' for Messerschmitt aircraft types should be used; 'Me' was not to be accepted on documents in order to ensure consistency in aircraft type designations.

 

Finally, on 12 May 1936, the Bf-110 Vl took off on its maiden flight from Augsburg. Testing of successive prototypes proceeded in the ensuing months, with various Procurement Plans throughout 1937 and 1938 calling for delivery of Bf-110 'B' and 'C' variants outfitted with differing engines (Jumo 210 and DB 601), and in ever changing quantities. Bf-110 production had, in November 1936, already been identified as taking place not only at Messerschmitt's main plant in Augsburg (the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke) but also at the Gotha factory.

 

While the prototypes flew without armament, by May 1939 development of firepower for the Bf-110 had ultimately settled on two MG FF cannon and four MG 17s in the nose, and a single, rearward-firing MG 15 for the Bordfunker. Two months later, a Bf-110B-1 fitted with a single 30 mm MG 101 cannon in place of the two MG FF was displayed at Rechlin to Hitler ('MG' was the designation given to all 'cannon'-sized, i.e. 20 mm or higher calibre, weapons up to the end of 1940 at least, in spite of most publications up to now incorrectly identifying the 30 mm weapon as 'MK', which designation only came at a later date). This concept would evolve into the Bf-110C-6 variant, albeit produced in very limited numbers. Only a small number of Bf-110 As were built, resulting out of an order for nine. Seven that were produced were used as test beds for the further development of the type. The other two were in fact delivered as 'B's.

 

Into Service

The Jumo 210 G-engined Bf-110B-1 entered limited production from April 1938 onwards. Including the two 'A's built as 'B's, the total production of B series Bf-110’s was 88. Production continued until October 1939, split between the Messerschmitt and Gotha works. As well as being issued to training units, the Bf-110B-1 also found its way to front line units Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG26) and 1.(Zerstörer ) Lehrgeschwader 1 [I.(Z)/LG1]. By the summer of 1939 the 'B' variant was being withdrawn from the front line and passed to training units, its place taken by the 'C' variant equipped with DB 601 engines with a redesigned lower engine cowling. The large radiators, a prominent feature of 'B' aircraft, were redesigned and relocated on the lower wing, resulting in a more refined cowling. The first production C series aircraft, the C-l, can be identified by the twin aerial leads from the mast situated on the cockpit roof being attached to both fins of the aircraft. From the C-2 series onwards there would only be a single lead to the starboard fin. The C-4 would appear similar to the C-2 externally, and the reconnaissance version, the C-5, would also be difficult to identify from the C-2 and C-4, since the modification involved the internal fitment of a camera. The fairing enclosing the 30 mm cannon beneath the fuselage clearly identified the C-6 version. The 'D' series' most distinguishing feature was the extended rear fuselage that housed a dinghy and emergency equipment for life-saving purposes over water, with the' Oackelbauch' fuel tank or bomb racks under the fuselage being a further identifying feature of the type. The C-7 was a factory conversion of the earlier C sub-variants (but not the C-6) that was retro-fitted with bomb racks, and only a few reached units in 1940. The main distinguishing feature of the E variant, which began to see operational service with some units towards the end of 1940, was the small rectangular air inlet on the nose.

 

The first unit to be equipped with the 'C' variant was I.(Z)/LG1. Having missed combat in the Spanish Civil War, the Bf-110's first experience of combat conditions occurred at the outbreak of the Second World War over Poland. Less than 100 serviceable machines were available on 1 September 1939. I.(Z)/LG1, I. Gruppe, Zerstörergeschwader 1 (I./ZG1) and I. Gruppe, Zerstörergeschwader 76 (I./ZG76) all saw action, having been outfitted with the Bf-110. The three Zerstörer units were distributed across the whole of the front.

 

The Polish Campaign

On 1 September 1939 Germany attacked Poland across a broad front, but the prevailing bad weather conditions prevented any large scale initial deployment of Zerstörer units at the outbreak of the war. 2./ZG76 under Oberleutnant (Oblt.) Wolfgang Falck was airborne early in the morning but encountered no Polish opposition. In the afternoon, elements of I./ZG76 were locked in combat with Polish fighters and made their first claims of the war, but also suffered their first losses. An ominous sign, perhaps, that in fighter-versus-fighter combat the Messerschmitt 110 would ultimately suffer unacceptable losses.

 

The first day also saw I./ZG1 in action, but it suffered a major loss on the following day when Hauptmann (Hptm.) von Mullenheim, Staffelkapitän of 3.Straffel was killed in action against the nimble PZL P.ll fighters. His place at the head of the Staffel was taken by Oblt. Walter Ehle, a future night fighter ace. On the first day 1.(Z)/LG1 provided escort for Heinkel He 111 bombers, and their role could be considered less than successful once Polish fighters intercepted. Six Heinkels were shot down, with two Polish fighters being claimed by the Messerschmitt 110 pilots. Matters improved in the afternoon on a further bomber escort mission when 1.(Z)/LG1 lodged claims for five enemy fighters. In the main, the Polish fighters were slower, and more lightly armed, but on occasions proved to be nimble and determined opponents.

 

In the days following, the Bf-110’s were regularly in action, with varying degrees of success I./ZG1 filed relatively few claims while I.(Z)/LG1 claimed 30 victories. As the Polish campaign ground to its inevitable conclusion with German forces advancing inexorably through Poland, the role of the Zerstörer units changed. From bomber escort, their duties moved to that of ground support. Seeking out and attacking elements of Polish ground forces in their headlong retreat, this type of action was not universally liked by the Bf-110 pilots, who at that time saw their task as air-to-air combat and protection of their flying comrades in other units rather than in ground-attack missions. Among the losses suffered during the Polish campaign was Major Karl Hammes, the 43 year-old Staffelkapitän of 1./ZG1. Hammes had had a somewhat chequered life. Born in March 1896, he enlisted at the outbreak of the First World War and served initially as an artillery officer. Obtaining a transfer to the air force, he flew initially with a reconnaissance unit before transferring to Jasta 35. With that unit he claimed four aerial victories before being badly wounded in combat on 9 September 1917. By this time he had attained the rank of Oblt. and been awarded the Iron Cross, First Class. His wounds were so severe that he undertook no further front line flying before the end of the war. His life then took a completely new course, as he embarked upon a career as an opera singer. He reached the top of that profession 'as a baritone, appearing at the Kroll Opera House in Berlin and the State Opera in Vienna among other top venues. The lure of the Luftwaffe proved too much, however, and he enlisted again in June 1937. Promotion to Hptm. followed in March 1938. By the outbreak of war in September 1939 he held the rank of Major and led 1./ZG1, part of I.Gruppe under the overall control of Gruppenkommandeur, Major Joachim-Friedrich Huth, another First World War veteran. So it was that while leading 1.Staffel on the morning of 6 September on an escort mission for Stukas, the German fighters came under attack from Polish P.11c fighters. Major Hammes' Bf-110C-1, coded 2N+IH, received hits and was seen to go down in a shallow glide. Although effecting a relatively good belly-landing, Major Hammes died of his wounds. His Bordfunker, Oberfeldwebel (Ofw.) Walter Steffen, was wounded and taken into captivity, returning to Germany when the Polish campaign was concluded. Thus ended the colourful life of Major Karl Hammes, opera singer and fighter pilot. His place as Staffelkapitän of 1./ZG1 was taken by Oblt. Martin Lutz, who would feature prominently during the Battle of Britain with Erprobungsgruppe 210 (Erpr.Gr.210).

 

Phoney War

Following the cessation of hostilities against Poland, matters settled into what was termed the 'Phoney War' or 'Drôle de Guerre'. It appeared to be more a case of all sides taking stock and not quite knowing what to do next. In this period, the opportunity was taken to convert those Bf-109 equipped Zerstörer units to the Bf-110. For example, II./ZG1 converted from the Bf-109s used in the Polish campaign to Bf-110’s, and Zerstörergeschwader 2 (ZG2) made the same conversion. Although this period saw one of the severest winters for many years, it also saw one of the first major encounters between the German fighter force and Allied aircraft.

 

December 1939 - Heligoland Bight

An event of note occurred on 18 December 1939 when the RAF sent a force of Wellington bombers to Wilhelmshafen. This proved to be an ill-advised move, since the Luftwaffe was able to intercept with a mixed force of Bf-109s and Bf-110’s. The total number of aircraft at the disposal of the Geschwaderkommodore of Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1), Oberstleutnant Carl Schumacher, under whose overall command they came, amounted to between 80 and 100 fighters. I/ZG76, under Hptm. Gunther Reinecke, was the sole twin-engined unit assigned to Schumacher. However, when the bombers were intercepted, the Zerstörer engaged in a rather piecemeal manner. The Staffelkapitän of 2./ZG76, Wolfgang Falck, along with his wingman, Unteroffizier. (Uffz.) Heinz Fresia, was already airborne, and they were the first Bf-110 crews to engage the Wellingtons. After their attack they lodged claims for two Wellingtons each, but Falck's aircraft was the victim of defending fire and he had to crash-land on Wangerooge. Other, aircraft of I./ZG76 intercepted at intervals, and the final reckoning resulted in claims for shot down Wellingtons amounting to 38, of which I./ZG76 claimed 15. Many of these were not allowed to stand, but the Zerstörer crews could lay claim to their share of victories in this action. Post-war information from official RAF sources admitted the loss of 12 bombers, with a further three returning to Britain damaged. One interesting matter emerged from this mission by the Wellingtons. Luftwaffe examination of one of the downed RAF bombers concluded that no bombs had been carried, which perplexed intelligence officers. They were later staggered to learn that the mission was a 'navigation flight' according to the information provided by some surviving RAF aircrew. Aircraft could be replaced, but to lose so many valuable aircrew seemed a criminal waste of resources at the time.

 

The Scandinavian Campaign - April 1940

The first major campaign in 1940 came about through the political machinations of the opposing countries, with Scandinavia as the focal point. This northern part of Europe had taken on a strategic importance vital for the future prosecution of the war, for the deep water harbours it afforded to a major naval force, and the airfields that would allow a vital extension of any airborne undertaking. Among the many Luftwaffe units slated to take part in the offensive were I./ZG1 (now with Hptm. Wolfgang Falck as Gruppenkommandeur) and I./ZG76 under Hptm. Gunther Reinecke.

 

Operations commenced on the morning of 9 April with German ground forces crossing the border and marching into Denmark. I./ZG1’s role was to provide air cover for the paratroop landings at Alborg, but such was the ease of the operation that no opposition was encountered in the air and the unit was able to land on Alborg airfield. Commissioning Oblt. Victor Molders to find accommodation for his 1.Staffel in Alborg, Oblt. Martin Lutz could justifiably lay claim to the fact that he led the occupation of the town.

 

I./ZG76 had a far more difficult time in its support of the landings in Norway. 1.Staffel, under Oblt. Werner Hansen, was charged with gaining air superiority over Oslo-Fornebu airfield in advance of landings there by Junkers 52 (Ju 52) transports. Plans, however, had taken no account of the fact that bad weather could possibly playa part in the day's operations, and immediately things began to go awry when the first wave of transport aircraft turned back due to inclement weather conditions. 1.Staffel, however, pressed on to its allotted target as to turn back would risk running out of fuel before reaching safety - its only hope now was to be able to land at Oslo-Fornebu. Before reaching there they were attacked by seven Norwegian Air Force Gladiators and suffered the loss of two aircraft to the biplanes. So it was that upon arriving over the airfield the Staffel, now reduced to six Bf-110’s, were greeted with the situation that no landings had yet been made by Luftwaffe transport aircraft. When Ju 52s came into sight they did not disgorge paratroops, but were instead carrying regular troops. The second wave had arrived, not the first. Heavy ground fire greeted the first attempts of the first Ju 52s to land. This appeared enough to dissuade the others to land, and presented Hansen with a dilemma. Ordering Lt. Helmut Lent to go in first to land, Hansen and the remaining Bf-110’s remained overhead and watched as Lent's M8+DH finally came to a halt at the edge of the airfield. The remaining Bf-110’s of 1.Staffel then went in and landed safely, with the defending Norwegian ground forces having retreated. An eventful start for 1.Staffel!

 

Meanwhile Oblt. Gordon Gollob had taken off at the head of his 3./ZG76 and headed for Stavanger-Sola airfield. Like its counterparts from 1 Staffel, Gollob's formation encountered bad weather, and Gollob ordered a return to base. However only one Schwarm followed the order, the other carried on to its objective. Tragedy followed as two Bf-110’s collided and crashed into the sea with both crews being killed. The two remaining Bf-110’s, flown by Ofw. Fleischmann and Ofw. Groning, carried on to Stavanger, witnessed the paratroops alighting from the Ju 52s, and then set down there safely.

 

Belatedly, British landings were made in northern Norway, when the whole of southern Norway was in German hands and the central part of the country was also rapidly falling into German occupation. Throughout April, I./ZG76 continued to encounter RAF bombers and to chalk up victories. Among those lodging claims were Wolfgang Falck, Helmut Lent, and a later star of night fighting, Helmut Woltersdorf. But along with the successes came the inevitable losses. On 30 April I./ZG76 suffered a heavy loss when its Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Gunther Reinecke, was shot down following combat with a Bristol Blenheim. Reinecke's wingman, Oblt. Hans Jager was able to recount how Reinecke's aircraft was hit by return fire and suddenly plunged into the sea. On the same day the Gruppe lost two of its 'aces' when Lt. Helmut Fahlbusch and Ofw. Georg Fleischmann were both killed in action against British bombers. The Staffelkapitän of 1.Staffel, Werner Hansen, took over temporary command of the Gruppe until a new Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Werner Restermeyer, was posted in on 11 May.

 

In spite of the loss of Reinecke, missions continued, and with the issue of the' Dackelbauch' Bf-110D-Ds to the unit, I./ZG76 sent a detachment of crews equipped with this variant to Trondheim under the leadership of Oblt. Hans Jager. Their missions were to fly standing patrols and provide escort to Luftwaffe units mounting attacks on British forces in the far north of Norway. The additional fuel tank under the fuselage provided the extended range required of their duties, and flights of up to five hours were recorded. In the second half of May additional RAF units supplemented the British land forces, and the Dackelbauch detachment soon tangled with RAF fighters. Regular combat ensued, with the result that the strength of the British force soon dwindled. However, the RAF was still capable of taking on the Bf-110’s, as Hans Jager found out on 29 May during combat with Hurricanes of 46 Squadron. With one engine hit, he attempted to regain base, but that was no longer possible once the other engine failed. Making a safe landing, Jager and his Bordfunker were soon taken into captivity by Polish troops before being handed over to the British. Jager and his Bordfunker, Uffz. Helmut Feick, were shipped to England and later on to Canada to spend the rest of the war as prisoners.

 

The Norwegian campaign moved to its inevitable conclusion with German forces in the ascendancy, and by the middle of June the conflict was over. I./ZG76 remained in Norway, and from there would carry out its only mission of the Battle of Britain. Meanwhile, well before the conclusion of the Norwegian campaign, I./ZG1 would return to Germany in time to take part in the next major campaign, the attack on France and The Low Countries. But not before Wolfgang Falck and other pilots of I./ZG1 had experimented with twilight flights to attempt to seek out enemy aircraft, which ultimately led to the formation of the Luftwaffe night fighter force. For taking the lead in this particular matter, Falck would be charged with working up the first night fighter unit to combat readiness.

 

 

The Campaign in the West

When the Germans opened the Western campaign the countries opposing them could never have imagined the speed and ingenuity of tactics that were to be employed against them. This was to be no static military operation, but a fast moving campaign utilising both the speed of armoured units and close support from the Luftwaffe. This campaign would commit the greatest number of Zerstörer units since the start of the war, with over 350 Bf-110’s available.

 

Opening in the early hours of 10 May, Bf-110’s were involved in the action from the start. II./ZG1 was charged with a ground-attack mission against Vlissingen airfield, while I./ZG1 was to provide escort to Ju52/3s. The Dutch Air Force put up spirited resistance, but ultimately was no match for the modern Luftwaffe fighters, and by the close of 13 May it effectively ceased to exist.

 

On 11 May, I./ZG2 encountered a section of Hurricanes in the late afternoon. Two Bf-110’s were lost in the combat which followed, out of a total of seven for the day, ZG1 with three and ZG26 with two being the other units to report losses. However II./ZG76 lodged claims for five French fighters.

 

12 May saw III./ZG26 in action, and the Gruppe returned an impressive figure of eight enemy aircraft shot down for no loss. V.(Z)/LG1 was also in action on an escort mission, and suffered the loss of three Bf-110’s shot down. Four out of the six aircrew survived into captivity, however. Meanwhile the relentless German advance continued with increasing victory claims from Zerstörer crews.

 

Bf-110’s were in action in some strength again on 13 May, with II./ZG1 again operating in the role of ground-attack aircraft by strafing enemy airfields. ZG26 and II./ZG76 also were in action on a day when Sedan fell to the Germans and the course of the campaign shifted heavily in their favour. Among the losses was the Staffelkapitän of 5./ZG1, Hptm. Roderich Kuppers who, along with his Bordfunker, Feldwebel (Fw.) Erhard Behrend, was shot down and killed by AA fire.

 

14 May's main event was the desperate attacks by the Allied air forces against the bridges around Sedan, but this proved to be at a heavy cost. The air fighting had cost I./ZG52 two aircraft, with ZG26 also posting losses and Lt. Wolfgang Schenck of I./ZG1 getting his damaged Bf-110Back to base with a wounded Bordfunker on board.

15 May proved to be the day of heaviest losses so far for the Zerstörer units as contact with enemy fighters west of Sedan increased considerably. This was an ominous portent of things to come. 1./ZG1 lost two aircraft as a result of their collision; ZG2 suffered a single loss; 2./ZG26 had two aircraft shot down and another two returned damaged with wounded crews on board. Among the ZG26 losses was that of the Gruppenadjutant of I. Gruppe, Oblt. Hans-Gunther Koch, who was killed in action. Both Hptm. Herbert Kaminski, Staffelkapitän of 2./ZG26 and his Bordfunker returned to base wounded. ZG76 returned details of two Bf-110’s shot down and one damaged, 6./ZG76 recording the loss of Oblt. Hans-Jochen Knop and his Bordfunker who both survived into captivity and later returned to Germany in the forthcoming weeks, as did many others who landed in Allied hands. During the Battle of Britain the RAF would attempt to shoot down many former Luftwaffe prisoners again.

 

The following day resulted a lessening of activity, but also saw Wolfgang Schenck of I./ZG1 wounded in combat and hospitalised. He would not return to active service until September 1940. The steady toll upon the officer class within the Zerstörer continued, with the loss on 16 May of Lt. Georg Schwartzer of 15.(Z)/LG1 and Lt. Heinrich Bucksch of 1./ZG1.

 

V.(Z)/LG1 was in action once again on 17 May, and it suffered the loss of one of its combat veterans when Oblt. Werner Methfessel, Staffelkapitän of 14.Staffel, was shot down and killed, together with his Bordfunker to the west of Reims. Losses were relatively light, with V.(Z)/LG1 recording two damaged aircraft and I./ZG1 submitting one loss, that of Lt. Helmut Schwabedissen and his Bordfunker, both of 3.Staffel, killed in action.

 

On 18 May continuing heavy action resulted in ZG26 and ZG76 taking the losses in their contact with Allied fighters. The highest ranking officer to be shot down since the war began was posted missing on this day: Major Walter Grabmann, Geschwaderkommodore of ZG76. He was shot down in M8+XA and survived, later re-joining his unit after a particularly eventful period of captivity. Among the losses suffered by ZG26 was that of one of its Staffelkapitän, Hptm. Eberhard d'Elsa of 5.Staffel. D'Elsa refurned later from captivity, but such were his injuries that he never undertook front line flying duties again.

 

After the exertions of the previous days, 5./ZG26 had only three serviceable Bf-110’s on 19 May. In spite of that, and led by their new Staffelkapitän, Oblt. Theodor Rossiwall, a Condor Legion veteran, the crews undertook a mission in concert with other Bf-110 Staffeln, and were soon caught up in combat with French Moranes. Their aircraft complement was reduced to two when Oblt. Artur Niebuhr and his Bordfunker had to abandon their aircraft while returning to base.

 

Losses due to combat on 20 May were few, but of the two losses and one damaged Bf-110’s recorded, two involved Staffelkapitäne. 1./ZG2 lost Oblt. Fritz Ludders killed in action, while 7./ZG26 had Staffelkapitän Oblt. Kurt-Wilhelm Heinrich wounded. Heinrich succumbed to his injuries on 24 May.

 

In the following days, the Zerstörer units began to meet Spitfires more frequently as the German land-forces moved ever closer to the Channel coast, and Spitfire squadrons could operate from the southern airfields in England in support of the increasingly desperate Allied situation in France. During the period 21 to 25 May the losses were spread across the Zerstörer units, and fairly minimal, but the pace began to pick up again on 26 May, when the focus of Luftwaffe attacks turned to the Allied pocket around Dunkirk. With attention now firmly on Dunkirk, the RAF effort from bases in England increased considerably; and the losses for the Bf-110 units in the following days would reflect this, as the limitations of combat with modern single-engined enemy aircraft became clear. It was during this phase of the campaign that I./ZG1 started to test the 30 mm cannon-armed Bf-110C-6s that they had taken on charge.

 

On 26 May I./ZG2 suffered a heavy loss when Gruppenkommandeur Major Johannes Gentzen crashed while taking off from Neufchateau and was killed. Gentzen was one of the earliest 'aces' of the Bf-110 units. The loss was compounded by the fact that Gruppenadjutant Lt. Hartwig-Borris Domeier was occupying the Bordfunker position and was also killed in the crash. Elsewhere, I./ZG1 lost two Bf-110’s from its Gruppenstab (Staff Flight) when Gruppe Technical Officer, Oblt. Konrad Martin, and Lt. Werner Kleinecke failed to return from a combat mission. Kleinecke and his Bordfunker Otto Schamberger both later returned from captivity.

 

27 May presaged further losses, with I./ZG52 having three Bf-110’s shot down. One loss was that of Lt. Christian-Friedrich von Neumann, the Gruppenadjutant, who was shot down by RAF fighters. The only loss for the rest of the month resulted from a crash during take-off of a 5./ZG1 machine which was carrying a crew of three for a cross-country flight. All three on board were killed. Matters did not always go the way of the RAF, however. On 31 May 5./ZG26 had the opportunity to 'bounce' a formation of Spitfires and claimed five victories for no loss to themselves.

 

In the last days of the Dunkirk evacuation, Zerstörer continued to be active. I./ZG1 were in action on 1 June, and suffering losses again. With two shot down and two damaged, the aircrew losses included Oblt. Jurgen Moller from 2.Staffel who, together with his Bordfunker, survived into captivity. Minimal casualties followed up to 4 June, when the Royal Navy took the last troops off the beaches at Dunkirk.

 

With the Dunkirk pocket eliminated, the German armed forces turned their attention to the drive south and west. In the first half of June, the German Army's advance continued unabated with ZG1 still being heavily involved and carrying most of the losses, albeit relatively lightly. On the credit side, ZG26 figured prominently in claiming victories over French aircraft.

 

One noteworthy event was to occur in the early days of June. On 4 June a formation of He-111s flagrantly violated Swiss air space, accompanied by Bf-110 fighters from II./ZG1. Swiss Air Force Bf-109s responded and shot down one of the escorting fighters from 6./ZG1. Not satisfied with this, II./ZG1

 

were tasked to fly over Switzerland once more on 8 June and again Swiss Bf-109s took off to intercept. This time the Swiss Bf-1095 exacted a higher toll than four days previously. II./ZG1 suffered the loss of four Bf-110’s, two from 4.Staffel and one from each of the other two Staffeln. Of the two 4.Staffel aircraft shot down, three aircrew were killed. The 5.Staffel Bf-110, a C-l, 2N+GN, W. Nr. 2831, was put down relatively intact by Fw. Manfred Dahne after taking hits from AA fire and in combat with a Swiss Bf-109. Dahne and his Bordfunker, Herbert Klinke, were repatriated, and whereas Klinke survived the war, Dahne was to lose his life over England later in the year. The 6.Staffel aircraft to be lost was that of Staffelkapitän, Oblt. Gerhard Kadow. Kadow, like Dahne, would be shot down over England a few weeks later, but unlike Dahne he would became a prisoner of the British. Swiss losses amounted to one Bf-109 E which belly-landed after combat. After this incursion on 8 June, and the consequent losses to the Luftwaffe, no further forays by Bf-110 units were made over Swiss air space.

 

As the month progressed and matters drew to their inevitable conclusion in the Western campaign, ZG26 bore the brunt of most of the losses in combat. All Zerstörer units would soon be preparing for the next campaign: the attack on, and potential invasion of, Great Britain.

 

Battle of Britain

In the campaign against the British Isles in 1940, the Luftwaffe was potentially entering for the first time a static campaign. It required a completely different approach to that applied in the Spanish Civil War and to the other campaigns in the previous nine months. There would be no advancing front line, no direct support to ground troops. In front of them, instead of the pell-mell retreat of enemy ground forces and the consequent lack of a co-ordinated approach of the opposing air forces to take them on, the Luftwaffe units and crews would find themselves up against the most modern aerial defensive system in the world at that time, fielding fighters that were equal to their own single-engined Messerschmitt Bf-109s, and more than capable of taking on the twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf-110’s and the Stukas and bombers in their armoury. A tracking system that picked raids up as they formed off the French coast, and continued to monitor their progress inland after they crossed the English coast through the Royal Observer Corps, was the kind of surveillance never before encountered by the Luftwaffe. Moreover, following the Polish, Scandinavian and Western campaigns, the Luftwaffe would also be facing an air force which, for the first time, had a considerable number of pilots who had already faced it in combat. An additional factor in the equation was the 'no man's land' separating the two sides. The English Channel, 22 miles at its narrowest point, gnawed away at the psyche of Luftwaffe crews with the ever-present fear of a faltering aircraft plunging down into it, or a healthy fighter aircraft running out of fuel before reaching the safety of land on the other side. 'Kanalkrankheit' (Channel sickness) was an unwitting ally of the defending British force. In the light of post-war knowledge the functions of the intelligence sections of both sides also had a major role to play in the ultimate shape of the Battle, and its outcome. The RAF had a detailed knowledge of the Luftwaffe, its dispositions, locations and strengths, its personalities and morale, and this knowledge grew as the Battle progressed. Surreptitious processing of prisoners, by means of 'stool pigeons' and hidden microphones, as well as normal interrogation and filtering of possessions founded on downed airmen, all added to the overall picture of the Luftwaffe put together by the RAF's Intelligence Section. The Luftwaffe had an equally extensive Intelligence Section, but it seemed to be flawed in that it appeared to take at face value all the reports from Luftwaffe crews concerning the number of RAF aircraft shot down, and the damage caused to airfield and ground installations. Over-estimation leading to over-optimistic assessment would be a crucial factor in the summer of 1940.

 

July On 1 July the only unit formed specifically for operations against the United Kingdom came into existence. Erprobungsgruppe 210 (Erpr.Gr.210), which translates roughly as Test Wing 210, was formed at Koln-Ostheim airfield under the command of Hptm. Walter Rubensdorffer. Rubensdorffer, a Legion Condor veteran, had spent a period of time at the Air Ministry before taking up his new post. The unit has previously been credited with having hand-picked crews, or being a unit with elite flyers. Neither is correct. The unit was formed from existing units and crews posted in, mainly straight out of training school. 1.Staffel was formed from I./ZG1 (apart from Lt. Victor Molders who went to night fighters, and Lt. Horst Marx who moved to the Bf-109E equipped 3.Staffel of Erpr.Gr.210). 2.Staffel was formed from 3.Staffel, Stukageschwader 77 (StG. 77), and 3.Staffel was formed from 4.Staffel, Jagdgeschwader 186 (4./JG 186). Among the crews posted straight in from training were Lt. Erich Beudel and his Bordfunker, Obergefreiter (Ogefr.) Heinrich Diemer, and Uffz. Werner Neumann and his Bordfunker, Ogefr. Karl Stoff. Additionally, because of his specialist (albeit limited) knowledge of using the Bf-109 E as a fighter-bomber, Hptm. Karl Valesi was seconded to 3.Staffel.

 

In the weeks leading up to the formation of Erpr.Gr210, the expectation was that the unit would oversee the testing and operational development of the projected Messerschmitt Me 210. However such were the delays in that aircraft's program development that the unit was used instead to develop the fighter-bomber concept. Allied to that, the Messerschmitt Bf-110C-6 aircraft on charge with I./ZG1 were transferred with the crews to 1./Erpr.Gr.210, and the new Staffel operated these aircraft in July and the first half of August in missions against England. The 'C-6', of which only 12 were ever built, was not a bomb-carrying Bf-110 - it carried a 30 mm cannon housed in a large fairing under the central fuselage in place of the standard two 20 mm cannon. The 30 mm cannon-armed Bf-110 was factory built; it was not a modification that could be fitted 'in the field'. Erroneously referred to in most publications as the MK 101, the correct designation for the 30 mm cannon of 1940 was, in fact, MG 101. All armament of 'cannon' calibre (i.e. 20 mm or above) in the Luftwaffe in 1940 was referred to as 'MG': witness the MG-FF and MG-FF/M 20 mm guns in both the Bf-109 and Bf-110.

 

The unit code for Erprobungsgruppe 210 was 'S9'. However, the Bf-110C-6s retained their old unit codes of '2N' until the first fighter-bombers were taken on charge by 1.Staffel at the end of the first week in August. It was only then that all the unit's aircraft carried the 'S9' code. 2.Staffel and the Gruppenstab took on charge the first batch of 13 Bf-110D-0/B fighter-bombers delivered from the factory. In the forthcoming weeks these units would figure prominently in the developing battle for supremacy of the skies over England.

 

By 1 July the re-organisation of the Zerstörer forces was complete. Whereas ZG26 remained intact, ZG2, previously a single Gruppe, was increased to two Gruppen strength with I./ZG52 being re-designated II./ZG2. ZG1 was disbanded. With 1.Staffel becoming 1./Erpr.Gr.210, the other two Staffeln of I. Gruppe

 

The Messerschmitt Bf-110C-6

A somewhat unusual aircraft appeared in the skies of Western Europe in the spring and summer of 1940. Whereas in the standard Bf-110 fighter there was a change from the two 20 mm MG-FF cannon to the improved MG-FF/M, in the C6 sub-variant there was a radical adjustment to the armament in the lower nose. This involved a change that could only be undertaken in the construction factory not in the field. In place of the two 20 mm cannon, a single 30 mm cannon, housed in a large fairing, was mounted centrally under the fuselage. The origins of this cannon could be found in the Solothurn S-18-1000 20 mm anti-tank rifle. Rheinmetall took that design and scaled it up to a 30 mm configuration. The test bed for the installation of the prototype in a Bf-110 was Bf-110B-1, D-AAPY. Air tests were considered a success, and plans were set in place for a production version. In 1940, all guns of 20 mm calibre or higher were still designated 'Gewehr' (gun), not 'Kanone' (cannon), hence the MG-FF and MG-FF/M 20 mm armament in Bf-109 Es of 1940.The 30 mm Kanone installed in the C6 was given the designation 'MG 101'. One pilot, when questioned about the qualities of the C6, stated that the fitment of the 30 mm cannon actually improved the flying characteristics of the machine, as the placement of the cannon changed the centre of gravity of the aircraft, making it far easier to handle in the air. In early June 1940 two Bf-110C-6s were issued to I.Staffel, Zerstörergeschwader 1 for operational testing. These aircraft were allocated to two of the most        experienced pilots of the Staffel, Oberleutnant Martin Lutz, and Oberleutnant Victor Molders. Their remit was to test the aircraft's capability in attacks against ground targets, with the caveat that under no circumstances should the aircraft fall into enemy hands. After a regular bomber escort mission, the two pilots, with their Bordfunkers, would take off in the C-6s and seek out targets of opportunity. The Staffel took on charge more C6s during June, and upon its re-designation to 1.Staffel, Erprobungsgruppe 210 on I July 1940, it took its C6s with it to this new experimental unit. Ultimately, a total of only 12 C6s would be issued from the Gotha factory.

 

Upon its formation, Erprobungsgruppe 210 had a mixed bag of aircraft types. 1.Staffel had only C-6s; Gruppenstab and 2.Staffel took on charge the first batch of Messerschmitt Bf-110 fighter-bombers, designated Bf-110D-0/Bs, and 3.Staffel were outfitted with the fighter-bomber version of the Messerschmitt Bf-109, the Bf-109E4/B. With this melange of Messerschmitts, Erprobungsgruppe 210 entered the Battle of Britain. Evidence from the flight log book of Leutnant Erich Beudel of I./Erpr.Gr.210 shows that the individual aircraft letter (the third character in the fuselage code) of the C6s with I./ZG1 and I./Erpr.Gr.210 was selected from the second half of the alphabet. Leutnant Erich Beudel flew C6s between 9 July and 15 August with the individual letters 'P', 'R', 'O’, ‘N’, ‘S' and 'T'. Additionally, the old unit designation of ZGI, '2N' (the first two characters of the fuselage code) was carried on the C6s of 1./Erpr.Gr.210 until the Staffel received its first batch of D-0/B fighter-bombers in early August, when all aircraft of the Staffel then carried the Erprobungsgruppe 210 code of 'S9'.

 

In July and early August, the C-6s were involved in providing escort to the Bf-110 fighter-bombers of the unit carrying out attacks on shipping around the south-east coast of England and undertaking armed reconnaissance missions seeking out convoys and reporting back their position. On occasion they would also carry out attacks on ships with the 30 mm cannon if a suitable opportunity presented itself. It was on one such escort mission, on 29 July, that the aircraft of Leutnant Erich Beudel was hit in combat with Hurricanes of 151 Squadron, and he managed to crash-land his damaged Bf-110C-6, 2N+RH, back in France with his Bordfunker, Obergefreiter Heinrich Diemer, being hospitalised due to wounds he received during combat. The Staffel recorded losses of C-6s in action on 30 July (one), and 11 August (two) when it operated a mixed force of C-6s and D-0/Bs for the first time. With the arrival of the D-0/B aircraft, and the shift of the Luftwaffe to land targets, the use of the c-6 diminished. However, on the raid against Croydon in the early evening of 15 August, one C-6 was lost, the only one to crash on the English mainland during the entire course of the Battle of Britain. Leutnant Erich Beudel and his new Bordfunker, Otto Jordan , were both killed as a result of being shot down in S9+TH. This gave the RAF, and in particular the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, the opportunity to examine the MG 101 and its armament.

 

The remaining C-6s were retained by Erprobungsgruppe 210, and when that unit was redesignated Schnellkampfgeschwader 210 in April 1941 and transferred to the East weeks later to take part in the assault on Russia, the C-6s moved with it. Evidence from the damage/loss reports shows that the remaining C-6s were distributed to the II.Gruppe of the new unit. Inevitably, further losses were suffered. On 18 October 1941 a C-6 coded S9+M of 4./SKG210 did not return from a combat mission south of Moscow , and on 16 December a further C-6 coded S9+MN of 5./SKG210 failed to return from operations. An interesting point about tins loss was the fact that the aircraft carried three personnel rather than the usual two. As well as a pilot and Bordfunker, a 'Waffenwart', a member of the growld crew specialising in armament, was also listed as missing. His presence on board may have meant the Staffel was having problems with the 30 mill cannon and the Waffenwart went along to assess what was happening under combat conditions. The final recorded loss of a C-6 within the lineage of E1pr. Gr. 210 - SKG210 ZG1 occurred on 27 February 1942 when S9+SP of 6./ZG1 was lost south of Mosalsk.

 

Later in the war three C-6s were in service with III./ZG26 in North Africa. Their allocation to that unit almost certainly came about through the C-6s being sent to a repair facility, and then issued to a front line unit requiring replacement aircraft.

 

Although the C-6 passed into history, the principle of mounting a heavy calibre weapon under the fuselage of the Bf-110Did not cease. Later in the war, the Bf-110G-2 variant was fitted with a 37 mill cannon, known as the 'Flak 18', with the intended purpose of using it as a tank destroyer. It was, however, later used in action against American bomber formations.

 

were transferred to the emerging night fighter force. II.Gruppe, ZG1 was re-designated III./ZG76, to bring that unit up to the full Geschwader complement of three Gruppen. An interesting point regarding the two Gruppen which were re-designated was that both II./ZG2 and III./ZG76 retained their old Gruppe and Staffel identification letters in the unit code applied to the fuselages of their aircraft. Thus, II./ZG2, instead of changing the fourth character to 'M' (4.Staffel, 'N' (5.Staffel and 'P' (6.Staffel, continued to use 'H' (1.Staffel, 'K' (2.Staffel and 'L' (3.Staffel of I.Gruppe on their machines, as well as the unit code of 'A2'. Equally, III./ZG76 continued to use 'M' (4.Staffel, 'N' (5.Staffel and 'P' (6.Staffel when in fact it should have been using 'R' (7.Staffel, 's' (8.Staffel and T (9.Staffel. Moreover, the aircraft of III./ZG76 retained their old unit code of '2N' throughout the Battle, and indeed right through to April 1941 when it formed the II.Gruppe of Schnellkampfgeschwader 210 (SKG210), only then changing its unit code to 'S9'. The reason for retaining the old Gruppe and Staffel identifications has never been explained. The likely explanation is that adherence to standard Luftwaffe practice was simply ignored. It was no great task to overpaint letters on either side of the fuselage on about a dozen aircraft in each Staffel.

 

While a Bf-110D-0 of Aufklarungsgruppe Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (a Luftwaffe Headquarters based unit) did not return from a reconnaissance sortie to Scotland on 6 July, it appears most likely that V.(Z)/LG1, under the leadership of Hptm. Horst Liensberger, was the first Zerstörer unit to undertake operations over the Channel. The Gruppe commenced with an escort mission to Stukas on 4 July and on the forthcoming days continued with further escort duties for Stuka and reconnaissance aircraft. V.(Z)/LG1 claimed a notable success on 9 July, when it lodged a claim for all three Hurricanes of 43 Squadron encountered during one such mission. The fact was that only one Hurricane was lost, an early indication, perhaps, of the overclaiming that would infect both sides missions, and the numbers on both sides embroiled in combat, increased over the ensuing weeks. Along with its first claim in this new campaign, the unit also suffered its inevitable first loss on 9 July when the Bf-110 of Oblt. Joachim Glienke and Ogefr. Karl Hoyer ditched in the Channel on the return flight from one such escort mission. On this occasion both crewmen were rescued by the Seenotdienst. The unit was not to be so fortunate as the Battle progressed. III./ZG26 flew its first mission on 9 July, losing one Bf-110, but it was far more heavily engaged on the following day when providing escort to Do 17s out to attack the convoy 'Bread'. Tangling with the defending RAF fighters, the Zerstörer pilots filed claims for a total of 12 Spitfires and Hurricanes. With the escorting Bf-1095 claiming a further 11, the total of 23 was wildly inaccurate; in fact the true RAF losses were one shot down, one crash-landed and two damaged. In return III./ZG26 lost three Bf-110’s and another returned to France damaged.

 

III./ZG76 was in action on 11 July, flying its first mission over the Channel as escort to Ju-87s. Initial underestimation of the strength of the raid soon changed and the Messerschmitts came under fierce attack, elements of 87, 238 and 601 Squadrons being involved. Once again the officer class in the Zerstörer Staffeln was hit hard: the flamboyantly-named Lt. Friedrich-Wolfgang Graf von und zu Castell of 7.Staffel was shot down into the Channel, and the Staffelkapitän of 9.Staffel, Oblt. Gerhard Kadow, recently returned from a sojourn in Switzerland, set down his Bf-110C-4, 2N+EP, following combat inland of the English coast, near Lulworth. The most notable loss was the nephew of Hermann Goring, Oblt. Hans-Joachim Goring, also of 9.Staffel, whose Bf-110 smashed into the ground with such force near Portland that no trace was ever found of him or his Bordfunker. Lt. Joachim Schroder completed the losses for 9.Staffel and the Gruppe, surviving into captivity whereas his unfortunate Bordfunker was killed. A very sobering first mission for the Gruppe against opposition that proved to be determined and well directed by RDF.

 

On 13 July Erpr.Gr.210 undertook its first mission of the Battle of Britain. From its home base at Denain, this unit would fly to a forward airfield near the French coast for operations against England. St. Omer-Arques was used initially, but from 11 August Calais-Marek became the unit's jumping-off base for operations. The Gruppe's first action was against two convoys near the mouth of the Thames. Without interception from RAF fighters, the unit claimed hits on a total of 20,000 tons of shipping, and all aircraft returned to France. V.(Z)/LG1 was also in action, escorting reconnaissance 00 17s to the English coast, and being intercepted in the process. One loss and two damaged was the return for this incursion.

 

There was a lull in operations for a few days, but on 21 July RAF Intelligence was able to get its hands on the relatively rare 'C-5' reconnaissance version of the Bf-110. 5F+CM, with Oblt. Friedrich-Karl Runde and Bordfunker Fw. Willi Baden on board. They were shot down by Red Section of 238 Squadron after an eventful flight over southern England during which they shot down a Hawker Hart and a Fairey Battle.

 

Repaired with parts taken from Gerhard Kadow's 2N+EP, it would be test flown by the RAE at Farnborough. Meanwhile Erpr.Gr.210 had continued its raids against coastal shipping, and on this day the crew of Oblt. Alfred Habisch and Uffz. Ernst Elfner of 2.Staffel counted 78 hits on their aircraft and suffered a collapsed starboard undercarriage upon landing back in France after one such sortie.

 

In the following days the two Bf-110 losses occurred in Erpr.Gr.210. On 24 July, while attacking a convoy, the 2.Staffel fighter-bomber of Uffz. Paul Hermann and his Bordfunker Uffz. Heinz Meinhardt received a direct hit from AA fire from the convoy it was attacking and plunged into the North Sea east of Harwich. As a mark of respect for the first pilot of the unit to be killed in action, the name 'Uffz. Hermann' was inscribed above the unit emblem of one of 2.Staffel 's machines. The same Staffel suffered another loss on 27 July when, once again on a shipping strike, the Bf-110D-0 of Oblt. Franz Fallenbacher received a direct hit from AA fire, and, with its bombs still attached, blew up in the air. By the end of 27 July, Erpr.Gr.210 claimed to have sunk 80,000 tons of British shipping in the two weeks it had been operational.

 

The remaining daylight casualties for the Zerstörer units to the end of July rested with Erpr.Gr.210, which, throughout July, was almost certainly the most active Zerstörer unit in the Luftwaffe’s armoury. On 29 July the unit's fighter bombers attacked the convoy 'Cat', escorted by three Bf-110C-6s of 1.Staffel and 30 Bf-110’s from ZG26. Attacked by 151 Squadron, the C-6 of Lt. Erich Beudel and his Bordfunker Ogefr. Heinrich Diemer took the full force of an attack by one of the Hurricanes. On this occasion Beudel managed to get his damaged machine, 2N+RH, back to St. Omer-Arques. On the following day, two C-6s of 1.Staffel conducted an armed reconnaissance patrol over the North Sea. Having found the convoy 'Pilot' and attacked it, they were in turn attacked by FlU. Hamilton and Sgt. Allard of 85 Squadron. In the combat that followed, Lt. Hans Herold and his Bordfunker were shot down into the North Sea and posted as missing. The other Bf-110C-6, piloted by 1.Staffel 's Kapitan, Oblt. Martin Lutz, managed to return to France. Thus ended a month of somewhat varied success for the Zerstörer units. A month that saw, however, the Admiralty prohibiting its destroyers from patrolling the Channel in daylight. An acknowledgement, perhaps, of the potency of the shipping attacks in the first weeks of this latest campaign.

 

 

August

The early days of August saw little combat activity; the main event to take place was the equipping of 1.Staffel. Erpr.Gr.210 with fighter-bomber Bf-110D-0/Bs. Conversion training to the use of the Bf-110 as a fighter-bomber then took place for crews who had previously flown the 30 mm cannon armed C-6 variant. 2.Staffel suffered the loss of two aircraft on 6 August: one was lost when it was pulled out of its dive too late during dive-bombing practice and crashed with the loss of both crewmen, and the other. on a test flight to check a repaired faulty engine, was abandoned by its crew when engine problems arose once more. In the latter aircraft the Bordfunker's position was occupied by an engineer from Daimler-Benz to monitor engine performance; he baled out safely. The pilot, Uffz. Heinrich Schultheis, baled out but hit the frame of the aircraft and was killed.

 

 

8 August - Convoy 'Peewit'

Leaving Southend on 7 August, convoy 'Peewit' was closely monitored by reconnaissance aircraft and was first attacked by German surface boats in the early hours of 8 August. The first attack on the convoy, shortly after 09:00 hours, was met with spirited opposition by defending RAF fighters. A second attack was launched in the early afternoon on the convoy, which had already suffered losses from the morning assault. On this occasion, fighter escort for the bombers was provided by the Bf-110’s of V.(Z)/LG1. Once again they tangled with intercepting British fighters, and once again their claims for victories were somewhat optimistic: 13. A feature of their claims was that they were all scored at low-level, between 500 and 1,000 metres. Set against that, 14.Staffel lost one Bf-110 and crew, with a further five returning to France with varying degrees of damage, one of whose pilots succumbed to his wounds.

 

 

11 August - central Channel and Thames estuary

Action early on 11 August involved the Bf-109s of 3./Erpr.Gr.210 shooting down barrage balloons protecting Dover Harbour, and the Bf-110’s of that unit then following up and bombing the harbour. All aircraft returned safely to Calais-Marck.

 

Later in the morning two major raids built up, both featuring Bf-110’s, and the RAF reacted in strength to each of them. Heading out of the Cherbourg Peninsula towards the Dorset coast, the Luftwaffe formation was tracked by British radar. Both Gruppen of ZG2 provided the fighter escort along with Bf-1095 of JG 2 and JG27 for Ju-88s and He-111s drawn from KG54 and KG27 respectively. Eight RAF squadrons rose to meet what was the largest raid yet to be sent against England.

 

Arriving at their holding point, the Bf-110’s formed a large defensive circle to draw the RAF fighters away from the incoming bombers. The ruse worked, and soon a heavy dogfight developed between the Spitfires and Hurricanes and the Bf-110’s of ZG2. This was sufficient for the bombers to get through to their allotted target, the oil storage tanks at Portland, which they duly hit. The consequences, however, were that fighter losses on both sides were relatively heavy. The Geschwaderstab of ZG2 lost Oblt. Gunther Hensel, who was shot down into the Channel and posted missing, and Oblt. Wilhelm Schaefer, who ditched into the Channel and was picked up by the German air-sea rescue service. I Gruppe lost four aircraft into the Channel, with a further four returning to France damaged. Among the I.Gruppe losses was Kommandeur Major Ernst 011. Hptm. Hans-Peter Kulbel, Staffelkapitän of 2.Staffel, was appointed acting Gruppenkommandeur. II.Gruppe fared better on this occasion, losing only one machine with another returning to base damaged. As was the case whenever combat involving large numbers of aircraft took place, combat claims submitted far exceeded the actual losses of the other side. ZG2 alone claimed 17 victories, which, taken with the claims of JG 2 and JG 27, would be far more than the actual RAF fighter return of 15 losses and 9 damaged. However, overclaiming was endemic in all fighter forces. As this raid closed, another, further east, was preparing to take off for the Thames Estuary.

 

The target was convoy 'Booty' off the Essex coast, and Erpr.Gr.210 was tasked to carry out the attack on the convoy in concert with a formation of Oornier 17s from Kampfgeschwader 2 (KG2), with escort provided by I.Gruppe of ZG26. This would be the first mission that l./Erpr.Gr.210 would undertake with 'fighter-bomber' Bf-110’s, having taken on charge their first batch only a few days earlier in the month and having put the 1.Staffel fighter crews through a quick training programme in lining up a target and dropping bombs on it in a shallow dive. Four Bf-110C-6s also flew on this mission. The raiding force was able to attack the convoy before the RAF fighters intercepted, a mixed force of Hurricanes from 17 and 85 Squadrons and Spitfires from 74 Squadron. In the furious combat that followed Erpr.Gr.210 lost two Bf-110C-6s from 1.Staffel, all four crewmen being posted as 'missing', records subsequently being amended to 'killed in action'. 1.Staffel, ZG26, also lost two aircraft, with a further two Bf-110’s from 2.Staffel, ZG26 managing to get back to France with combat damage. Among the two losses suffered by 1./ZG26 was the Bf-110 of Staffelkapitän Hptm. Johann Kogler, who was to spend some days in the waters of the North Sea before being rescued by the efficient German air-sea rescue service.

 

 

12 August - RDF stations, central south coast, Manston & Hawkinge

On what was to be its busiest day of the Battle of Britain, Erpr.Gr.210 took off from Calais-Marck around 09:30 hours on 12 August to attack RDF stations dotted around the south coast of England. Heading out low over the Channel, the unit split into four formations, each with a specific target. Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Walter Rubensdorffer set course for the RDF site situated in the tiny village of Dunkirk, north of Canterbury; Oblt. Otto Hintze led the Bf-109 E-4/Bs of 3.Staffel to the site at Dover; further along the coast Oblt. Wilhelm-Richard RoBiger led 2.Staffel towards Rye, while Oblt. Martin Lutz took his 1.Staffel to the most westerly target, Pevensey. Given the small size of the targets involved, all four formations acquitted themselves well by hitting them. The masts, however, were not toppled, and although three of the four stations were temporarily put out of action (Dunkirk was the only site to continue to function), they were all back in operation before the end of the day. All aircraft of Erpr.Gr.210 returned to Calais-Marck.

 

Towards midday, Ju-88s of KG51 turned out in force for a raid against Gosport, Portsmouth Harbour and the RDF station at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight. Among the escort fighters for this raid were the Bf-110’s of ZG2 as well as II. and III.Gruppen of ZG76. Once again, RAF fighters did not intercept until the bombers had completed their task. I. and III./KG51 hit Portsmouth Harbour, while II.Gruppe together with the Stabsschwarm of KG51 made a devastating attack on the Ventnor RDF site, putting it out of action for three days. Following the bombing, the bombers finally came under attack from RAF fighters, who exacted a toll of eight bombers shot down, including that of the Geschwaderkommodore of KG51, Oberst Dr. Johann-Volkmar Fisser. Intercepting fighters also engaged the Bf-110’s, and I./ZG2 lost two Bf-110’s with a further two managing to get back to France with combat damage. One of the losses was the aircraft of acting Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Hans-Peter Kulbel, whose Bf-110 crashed into the Channel off Portsmouth. Kulbel's tenure as acting Gruppenkommandeur had lasted only one day. While lodging claims for six victories, III./ZG76 did not escape unscathed, 8.Staffel losing two aircraft, including that of Staffelkapitän, Hptm. Max Graf Hoyos.

 

Meanwhile, re-armed and re-fuelled, the Bf-110’s and Bf-109s of Erpr.Gr.210 took off from Calais Marck and headed for Manston airfield on the south-eastern tip of Kent. On the way they were joined by Dornier 17s of KG2, and the complete formation made its run-in to the target unopposed. The Manston Operations Record Book recorded 100 craters on the airfield, and 65 Squadron managed to take off as the raid was in progress, only one Spitfire not making it into the air due to its engine stalling. Heading back across the Channel, Erpr.Gr.210 was attacked, almost certainly by 54 Squadron Spitfires and the Hurricanes of 501 Squadron. One Bf-110 of 1.Staffel returned with slight damage following this interception.

 

Early afternoon produced a lull in proceedings, but in the late afternoon Erpr.Gr.210 took off again for its third mission of the day. Unescorted, it made its shortest journey of the day, diving down on Hawkinge airfield and hitting it with a precision attack. Although considerable damage was done to the airfield, it was not put out of action. All aircraft of the unit returned to Calais-Marck. Thus ended a day in which the Bf-110’s of various units had put in a major effort and suffered losses. In the case of Erpr.Gr.210 it was a day that would prove to be the most successful in its history. 'Adlertag', upon which the Luftwaffe High Command placed so much importance, would follow: the springboard for the Luftwaffe to achieve the ultimate defeat of the RAF.

 

 

13 August - 'Adlertag'

'Adlertag', 13 August, got off to the worst possible start when, due to unsettled weather conditions, all morning attacks were cancelled. However, in one of the more notable Luftwaffe raids of the Battle of Britain, communications went awry and although the recall order reached the Bf-110 Escort from ZG26, Oberst Fink's Do 17s from KG2 did not receive any such order. Frantic attempts by the Zerstörer crews to alert the Do-17 crews that they should return proved fruitless and the Dorniers continued to head for their target. Sticking rigidly to their orders, ZG26 returned to base, leaving KG2 to press on alone.

 

Things were to be no better later in the day when, towards midday, a planned raid with V.(Z)/LG1 taking the lead to draw off RAF fighters to allow KG54 to carry out an attack on Portland also miscarried. V.(Z)/LG1 duly carried out their allotted task, but the bombers this time received the cancellation order. Optimistically claiming nine RAF fighters destroyed (only one was in fact lost), Hptm. Liensberger's Gruppe suffered heavily, five Bf-110’s being lost, and another five returning to France in varying states of damage. The launch of 'Adlertag' finally occurred around 16.00 hours in the afternoon in a series of attacks on Portland and Southampton, as well as airfields on the south coast. Mixed fortunes were suffered by the escorting fighters of ZG2: I.Gruppe lost two Bf-110’s whereas II.Gruppe suffered no casualties on this occasion. However both Gruppen overclaimed, again helping to add to the belief in the higher echelons of the Luftwaffe that the fight against the RAF was being won, in terms of shooting down enemy fighters in considerable numbers. III./ZG76 was also on duty in this action, up from its new forward base of Jersey. Intercepted by Hurricanes, two Bf-110’s were lost, and the Gruppe had other aircraft return to Lannion in France with varying degrees of damage, including those of Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Dickore and his wingman, the Gruppe Technical Officer, Lt. Richard Marchfelder.

 

Further to the east, Erpr.Gr.210 finally took off for an attack on Southend (Rochford) airfield, escorted by I./ZG26. Weather conditions at this time of day were no better than in the morning and the mission was aborted, Erpr.Gr.210 releasing its bombs over Canterbury and returning to base. I./ZG26 became entangled with Hurricanes of 56 Squadron and, on this occasion, for the loss of one Bf-110, shot down four of the opposition. Others returned to France damaged, and Lt. Joachim Koepsell, disorientated after combat and desperately seeking a landfall, belly-landed at s'Hertogenbosch in Holland, some 265 kilometres from his base after a flight lasting two hours, forty five minutes!

 

'Adlertag' had not gone as expected, and had shown up flaws in the Luftwaffe’s communications system. Additionally, one of the great variables in all military conflicts came into play - the weather. What should have been a day's action by the Luftwaffe with a major impact on turning the course of the conflict its way turned out to be a rather indifferent affair.

 

14 August - Manston

Following the exertions of the previous days, the Luftwaffe’s response on 14 August was somewhat muted. The only action of note involved once more the Bf-110 fighter-bombers of Erpr.Gr.210. Bad weather hampered early morning operations, but towards midday the unit received the all-clear to undertake an operation. Initially 1.Staffel was briefed to attack the small civil airfield at Ramsgate, but ultimately it joined with 2.Staffel in attacking Manston airfield once again. On this occasion, however, the airfield defences were better prepared than two days previously, and as both Statteln dived to attack the airfield, the defences opened up. As a result, 2.Stattel lost two aircraft, both shot down directly over the airfield and crashing on it. Miraculously, one of the four crewmen survived. Bordfunker Gefr. Ewald Schank extricated himself from his stricken Bf-110 in time to deploy his parachute sufficiently to save his life. Landing among the bombs falling from his comrades' aircraft above, he was taken to the relative safety of one of the slit trenches before being transported to hospital, where he remained for 10 days. Manston airfield, however, took a hammering once again.

 

 

15 August - north-east coast

With better weather predicted, 15 August was to prove to be a busy day for the Zerstörer units. Operations against the English mainland commenced in the morning, but it was not until the afternoon that the Bf-110’s entered the fray. Luftflotte 5's entry into the Battle of Britain on 15 August was somewhat auspicious, and had a direct bearing on its units further employment in 1940. Operating from Scandinavia, the bomber force was escorted by the Bf-110D’s of I./ZG76 operating out of Stavanger. A feint raid by Heinkel He 115s to divert British attention from the main focus of attack approached the English coast on an incorrect track, and as a result inadvertently provided the RAF with early information concerning the course of the attacking force. As a result, four RAF squadrons were scrambled, and intercepted the raiders initially over the North Sea. Among the Bf-110 formation, the first to be shot down into the sea was Gruppenkommandeur Hptm. Werner Restermeyer, and in the combat which followed a further five losses were suffered. Of the 12 aircrew involved in these losses, only three survived into captivity. Three more Bf-110’s managed to return to base damaged. One of them crash-landed at Esbjerg with only the pilot, Uttz. Richter on board. Richter's Bordfunker had baled out over the North Sea and was posted missing. The losses suffered in this action resulted in I./ZG76 taking no further part in the Battle of Britain, and the unit was eventually recalled to Germany and incorporated into the emerging night fighter force.

Further south, II./ZG76 had also been heavily involved in action over the Channel. Flying escort to Ju-88s of Lehrgeschwader 1, they came under heavy attack from up to eight RAF squadrons in an action that took place in the area of the Ju 88s' target, Worthy Down airfield, and out over the Channel. While the Haifisch Gruppe pilots lodged victory claims, among whom was the rising star of 6.Staffel, Hans Joachim Jabs, it also recorded the loss of six Bf-110’s, with another two returning to France so badly damaged that they were classified as 100 per cent write-ofts. To complete the Geschwader's action for the day, III./ZG76 flew escort to Ju-87s of I./StG1 and II./StG2 in concert with a mixed force of fighters including the Bf-110’s of V.(Z)/LG1. While attempting to protect their charges, III.Gruppe lost four aircraft. Among the losses was its popular Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Dickore, whose Bf-110Collided with an intercepting fighter. Dickore's body was later washed ashore on the French coast. His place as Gruppenkommandeur was taken by Rolf Kaldrack, Staffelkapitän of 7.Staffel, who would be killed in action in the service of ZG1 on the Russian Front in February 1942. On this occasion, V.(Z)/LG1 fared better than their other Zerstörer counterparts, with just one Bf-110 returning to base damaged, with the crew wounded but safe.

 

15 August - Martlesharn Heath

During the mid-afternoon, Erprobungsgruppe 210 took off from Calais-Marck to attack Martlesham Heath airfield in Suffolk. For this mission, no fighter escort was provided. The unit flew in over the North Sea and reached the airfield unopposed, although Hurricanes of 1 and 17 Squadrons had been scrambled to intercept. The unit's bombs fell on the airfield, and the overall damage was compounded by a direct hit on a Fairey Battle loaded with 1000 Ibs. worth of bombs. Following the raid, the Hurricanes which had been scrambled to intercept the unit finally made contact, but on this occasion the losses were all on the RAF side. Three Hurricanes of 1 Squadron were shot down and one from 17 Squadron crash-landed. One Bf-110, piloted by Lt. Erich Beudel, received damage to the extent that it was not serviceable to fly on any other missions that day. Beudel would have to fly another of the unit's Bf-110’s for a raid later in the day.

 

15 August – Croydon

At around 18:20 hours in the early evening of 15 August, the Gruppenstab and all three Statteln of Erprobungsgruppe 210 took off from Calais-Marck to mount a raid on Kenley airfield. Bt 109 escort for the raid came from JG 52. Over the Channel, one Bf-110 from 2.Staffel had to turn back due to mechanical problems, reducing the attackers to 14 Bf-110’s and the eight Bf-109E-4/Bs of 3.Staffel. On the way to the target, the escort from JG 52 became detached and subsequently turned back to France, leaving Erprobungsgruppe 210 to continue on to the target alone. Approaching the target over Sevenoaks, for some reason Walter Rubensdorffer, the Gruppenkommandeur, lined up the unit and dived down to attack Croydon, not Kenley. In the meantime, 111 Squadron had taken off from Croydon, and 32 Squadron and all other fighters that were airworthy were scrambled from Biggin Hill. They were sighted by Erprobungsgruppe 210 climbing for position as the unit bombed Croydon, 3.Staffel going in last as was the custom with the unit, and then climbing to set about re-grouping and making course for France in the knowledge that two enemy squadrons were positioning to attack. Both RAF squadrons attacked as the unit attempted to reform, and although 'defence circles' (the practice of a Bf-110 formation forming a 'nose to-tail' circle to cover each other) were formed by the Zerstörer, upon breaking for home the losses started. All the staff officers in the Gruppenstab were shot down, Rubensdorffer and his Bordfunker, Ogetr. Richard Kretcher being killed in the crash of their Bf-110; Oblt. Horst Redler, Gruppenadjutant, dying three days later of his wounds while his Bordfunker, Johann Werner, survived into captivity. The unit's Technical' Officer, Lt. Karl-Heinz Koch, effected a good belly-landing near the coast, both he and Bordfunker Utfz. Rolf Kahl becoming prisoners. Kahl's injuries were so severe that he was repatriated in the mid-war years. Three more Bf-110’s were shot down, among them the only Bf-110C-6 to crash on the English mainland during the Battle, its 1.Stattel crew of pilot Lt. Erich Beudel and Ogetr. Otto Jordan both being killed in the crash. At 19, Otto Jordan was the youngest member of the unit to be killed in action. The only Bt 109 to be lost was that of Lt. Horst Marx, who unselfishly tried to escort his Gruppenkommandeur's crippled Bf-110 back to France, and in the process was pounced upon by a Hurricane of the Biggin Hill Training Flight. Marx, a former Bf-110 pilot with I./ZG1, baled out into captivity. 2.Staffel lost two Bf-110’s, with three of the four crew becoming prisoners of war. Fielding nine Hurricanes each, the two RAF squadrons suffered no losses in the action.

 

A young employee of Rollasons, George Stratton, recalled the Erprobungsgruppe 210 raid. "Although I do not remember how the day of 15 August 1940 began, no doubt I left my home in Howley Road and cycled to my place of work, Rollasons at Croydon Airport, arriving by the starting time of 8:00 a.m. Rollasons specialised in carrying out aircraft repairs and modifications and I was employed by them as a fitter to undertake carpentry, rigging and metalwork. I worked on a number of different aircraft and on the day of the raid I seem to remember a Handley Page Harrow being in the hangar and working on this.

 

"At the time, it was early evening, I was not aware of any warning being given. However, afterwards I realised that there must have been some indication of what was to happen as the hangar doors, that were sometimes left open during the summer months, were abruptly closed. My first indication came from the roar of aircraft close overhead and the whistling of falling bombs. All of us in the hangar seemed to run for cover in different directions. I cannot recall where others went but I ended up alone in a wooden shed located in a corner of the hangar. The shed had been provided for army personnel. I think they were there to provide security cover. As I lay there, I realised I was sheltering alongside a number of compressed air or gas cylinders that were being stored in the shed. It was all very confusing, but I can remember feeling the ground shaking and hearing muffled crashes. Then there was quietness and my only thought was to get away and go home. I got out of the shed as quickly as possible, found my bike and left the hangar.

 

"Outside I noticed a bomb crater nearby and there was chalk dust everywhere; I did not look back. Unlike my journey to work, I can clearly remember my return journey. People were standing in their doorways; at their front gates, and at the pavement edge. They were anxiously awaiting the safe return of their family members and hoping they had not been caught in the raid. I arrived home where my father was waiting at the gate and I can remember my sister commenting that my overalls were covered in dust.

 

"After a few days, instructions were received to report to Croydon Town Hall where I received my wages. As a result of the raid, Rollasons ceased operating from Croydon Airport. I could have transferred to their premises at Hanworth, but the journey would have been too difficult and so my employment with them came to an end.

 

"Thus ended a day that was later to be known within the Luftwaffe as 'Black Thursday'.

 

16 August

The Zerstörer force was once again in action on the day following 'Black Thursday', a day when Messerschmitt Bf-109 units suffered far heavier losses than their Messerschmitt Bf-110 counterparts. During the day elements of I./ZG26, II./ZG2, and II. and III./ZG76 were called upon as the Luftwaffe launched attacks in the east and central coastal areas of England. Airfields, as well as the Ventnor RDF station, in the central region came under attack from Stukas and level bombers. It was for a combat on this day also that the only award of the Victoria Cross to a Fighter Command pilot was made. Flight Lieutenant Nicholson of 249 Squadron received the award for attacking and shooting down a Bf-110 while remaining in the burning cockpit of his Hurricane. Whereas Bf-110 units suffered casualties, it has not proved possible to tie in the claim for Nicholson's Bf-110 with any loss suffered in the area at that time of day. Among the losses was Lt. Richard Marchfelder, the Gruppe Technical Officer of III./ZG76 and designer of not only the 'Running Dog' emblem found on Bf-109s of JG141 in the second half of 1939, but also the 'three wasps above clouds' 'Wespe' emblem of II./ZG1, which was to find its greatest fame as the large single wasp on Bf-110’s of ZG1 on the Russian and Mediterranean fronts. Marchfelder and his Bordfunker parachuted into captivity. Oblt. Ernst Hollekamp of 6./ZG2 and Lt. Walter Lemmer of 5./ZG76 were other casualties, but the highest ranking loss of this day was that of Major Harry Carl, Gruppenkommandeur of II./ZG2, who managed to get his battle-damaged Bf-110 back to France, but both he and his Bordfunker were killed in the ensuing crash-landing. The officer class of the Zerstörer units continued to be slowly drained away as the Battle progressed.

 

After the exertions of the previous days, 17 August resulted in a lull in proceedings, but the following day combat would be joined again in what one eminent historian has justifiably named 'The Hardest Day'. Whereas 15 September would later be known as 'Battle of Britain' day, the day's action on 18 August would result in the highest total losses overall for any single day of the Battle.

 

18 August

Following the loss of a reconnaissance Bf-110C-5 of 7.(F)/LG2 in the morning of 18 August, the first major Luftwaffe raid formed up in the area of the Pas de Calais. With allocated targets of Biggin Hill and Kenley, the bombers had among their fighter escort the Bf-110s of ZG26. One feature of the raids was to be the low-level attack on Kenley by 9./KG76, a role not normally allotted to standard bomber units, although this Staffel had practised such attacks during the western campaign some months earlier. The difficult time for the bombers and their escorts came after the completion of the raids, and it was at this time that ZG26 took heavy losses from the intercepting RAF fighters. Nine Bf-110’s were shot down, including those of I.Gruppe Adjutant, Oblt. Rudiger Proske, and the Staffelkapitän of 3.Staffel, Oblt. Hans-Jurgen Kirchoff. Proske survived into captivity, but Kirchoff was killed. As the Luftwaffe force retired to France, another raid, to be undertaken by Luftflotte 3, was making final preparations for a raid on airfields off the central coast of England. No Bf-110’s took part in this second raid, possibly due to the attrition and exhaustion suffered by both men and machines from the missions of the preceding days. This particular raid was to go down in the history of the Battle of Britain as the occasion when the Ju-87s of Stukageschwader 77 suffered grievous losses.

 

However, in late afternoon the indefatigable ZG26 once again escorted a force of bombers tasked to attack Hornchurch and North Weald. The ever-watchful eyes of the RDF chain tracked the incoming raid and, once again, the Zerstörer of ZG26 suffered losses. Notable among the late afternoon casualties for ZG26 was the Staffelkapitän of 2./ZG26, Hptm. Herbert Kaminski who ditched into the North Sea and, with Bordfunker Heinrich Strauch, spent four days in a dinghy before being rescued by the German air-sea rescue service. While over-estimating their claims again, ZG26 had 13 Bf-110’s shot down, with a further six crash landing back in France, two of which were classed as 100 per cent write-offs.

 

The days following saw little activity of note, due mainly to a period of indifferent weather over England. On 20 August Erpr.Gr.210 did lose one Bf-110 out of three sent to raid a convoy sailing off the south-east coast of England: they had the misfortune to be intercepted by six Spitfires of 66 Squadron airborne from Coltishall. ZG2 and ZG26 were in action on 24 August, the former losing one aircraft and the latter having one crash-land back at Arques, while a reconnaissance Bf-110 from the Auf. Gr. Db. d. L. was shot down over Sheerness. Erpr.Gr.210 once again paid a visit to Manston airfield, which was rapidly becoming unusable due to the regular bombardment it was receiving.

 

The following day saw a return to action for Zerstörer units, with most of them out in force. The two Gruppen of ZG2, III./ZG76 and V.(Z)/LG1 were part of the escorting force accompanying Ju 88s. Facing them was a combined force of Spitfires and Hurricanes from 87, 213 and 17 Squadrons (Hurricanes) and 602, 609 and 152 Squadron (Spitfires). With Bf-109 Staffeln involved as well, a wide-ranging combat took place as the opposing forces made contact. Once again, Luftwaffe claims in general, and Zerstörer claims in particular, were inflated. On the debit side, seven Bf-110’s and crews were lost, including pilot Fw. Manfred Dahne who had been shot down over Switzerland in early June. 1./ZG2 lost Staffelkapitän Oblt. Gerard G6tz, who parachuted into captivity. A further six Bf-110’s returned damaged, two being 100 per cent write-offs. It was the turn of ZG26 to take losses on 26 August: three aircraft were lost together with one damaged in combat from II./ZG2 over the Channel.

 

Activity slackened on the ensuing days, but on 30 August the tempo increased once again. Just before midday, III./ZG76 formed part of the escort for a formation of He-111s of KG1 on an attack on Farnborough. On this occasion the Zerstörer escaped without loss. In the late afternoon a further raid was mounted involving KG53's He-111s with escort drawn from II./ZG2, II./ZG26 and II./ZG76. As usual, RAF Squadrons were airborne and the Messerschmitt 110’s became the main target for two Hurricane squadrons, 56 and 242. In the combat that followed, the now inevitable losses occurred in the Bf-110 ranks. Among the losses were two Staffelkapitäne: Hptm. Adolf Schuldt, Kapitan of 5./ZG2 was killed along with his Bordfunker in Bf-110 0-0, A2+HK, while the Staffelkapitän of 4./ZG76, Hptm. Heinz Wagner and his Bordfunker were killed when their Bf-110C, M8+BM, crashed at Ponders End, Enfield, The Staffelkapitän of 6./ZG76, the future night fighter ace, Hptm. Heinz Nacke, managed to get his badly damaged Bf-110 back to St. Ingelvert, but in the process of landing his M8+KM he wrote it off completely. In spite of the damage to his machine, Nacke still claimed victories during this mission. They were to be his last of the Battle of Britain. Total casualties were four lost and five damaged. The attrition in the Zerstörer ranks was continuing, and in the next week would reach epidemic proportions.

 

One unit, however, carried out a successful mission on 30 August without suffering any loss of aircraft. Erpr. Gr, 210 took off from Calais-Marck just before 17:30 hours in the afternoon. Through a stroke of good fortune, a mains supply failure serving the RDF stations on the South Coast helped the unit cross the English coast undetected, and it penetrated deep inland without interception and hit Biggin Hill airfield hard. Water, gas, electricity and telephone services were cut, not being restored until the following day. Six Hurricanes of 79 Squadron took off from the airfield and claimed to have shot down two of the attacking aircraft, but Erpr.Gr.210 returned to base without loss.

 

Some Zerstörer units had an early start on 31 August, with raids being mounted against Debden and Duxford airfields, Because of the distances involved, Bf-110 units were tasked with long-range escort duties for these raids; the Bf-109 did not have the endurance to reach the target and stay for a sufficient time to extricate the bombers from attacking fighters. As a result, III./ZG26 escorted the Do 17s of II./KG2to Duxford, while V.(Z)/LG1 accompanied the Do 17s of III./KG2 to Debden. The bombers reached their objectives and successfully bombed their allotted targets. On this occasion, the Bf-110’s were quite successful in getting their charges away from the target and back on the home leg without too many difficulties, One Do-17 from II./KG2 was a write-off, and two from III./KG2 landed back at their base with combat damage, The Bf-110 units fared worse. V.(Z)/LG1 lost two aircraft, three of the four crew surviving into captivity. III./ZG26 had one shot down and the Gruppe Technical Officer, Oblt. Georg Christl, crash-landed his Bf-110Back at St. Omer-Arques.

 

Just after midday Erpr.Gr.210 returned to the target that had cost it the heaviest losses in its history: Croydon airfield. The unit reached and hit the target without loss, but suffered one shot down, a 2.Staffel machine, as they headed home, with two other 2.Staffel fighter-bombers returning to Calais-Marck damaged.

 

September

The tempo of the Battle was increasing, and in the early days of September, the Zerstörer units would begin to feel the full force of the RAF fighters ranged against them.

 

In the early afternoon of 1 September the' Haifisch Gruppe', II./ZG76, were in action over England again, escorting a bomber force to Biggin Hill. Oblt. Herget and Oblt. Jabs, both to become night fighter 'Experten' later in the war, each claimed two Spitfires and a Hurricane, and on this occasion the Gruppe retired to France without suffering any loss. However V.(Z)/LG1 lost a further two machines on this mission, one crew surviving into captivity.

 

On 2 September the Luftwaffe flew almost 1,000 sorties. In an early start, I. and II.Gruppen of ZG26 escorted a raid targeted at airfields either side of the Thames. Five RAF squadrons rose to meet the attack, but the bomber force reached its objectives and completed its mission. Only one bomber was shot down, with two others written off upon return to base following crash-landings. The Messerschmitt 110s had fulfilled their task once again in getting the bombers to their target and out again, but suffered the loss of two shot down, one from each Gruppe, with another from II.Gruppe returning to France with combat damage. On this occasion the RAF fighter losses were higher than the Zerstörer losses in the fighter-versus-fighter combat.

 

A further major raid developed after midday heading towards Dover with escort this time including the two Gruppen of ZG2. A head-to-head combat between 72 Squadron and ZG2 resulted in the loss of four Spitfires and three Messerschmitt 110’s, with another managing to reach Berck-sur-Mer badly damaged. Again a creditable return for a Zerstörer unit.

 

A raid later in the afternoon had the whole Geschwader of ZG26 over the Thames Estuary providing cover for a raid on Hornchurch. Once again, faced by Spitfires of 616 Squadron, the Zerstörer acquitted themselves well, with only one Bf-110 damaged against one Spitfire shot down.

 

II. and III./ZG76 were airborne for escort duties for the final major mission of the day which headed in over Kent before being intercepted by seven RAF squadrons. In the combat that followed II./ZG76 lost its Technical Officer, Oblt. Karl Wrede, who was killed together with his Bordfunker Uffz. Richard Kukawka. Another aircraft from 7.Staffel managed to limp back to France.

 

2 September had seen Bf-110’s involved in four major raids over southern England, and in the face of vigorous defending by the RAF all of the units had reason to be satisfied with their contribution to the overall escort to bomber formations. Certainly, on this day, they had been the equal of the Spitfires and Hurricanes. The following days and weeks would paint a different picture, however.

 

Mid-morning on 3 September witnessed another incursion by a major Luftwaffe force. RAF reaction was somewhat slow and North Weald was bombed without interception. RAF fighters intercepted soon afterwards, with I./ZG2 and III./ZG26 immediately going to the aid of the bombers. The Zerstörer pilots fought hard to protect their charges on the homeward leg, with,. and II.ZG26 waiting further south to supplement the escort cover back to France. In the bitter fighting I./ZG2 lost five aircraft, two as a result of a collision. Among their five losses were three officers: Oblt. Reinhold Messner (Gruppe Technical Officer), and Oblt. Kurt Muller and Oblt. Siegfried Gottschalt, both of 2.Staffel. III./ZG26 lost two Bf-110’s during the withdrawal, with a further two returning damaged, one ending up a total write-off. I. and II.Gruppen suffered no losses, with only a 3.Staffel machine taking damage and managing to get back to France. Notwithstanding the losses, the Bf-110’s fulfilled their mission, with the attacking bombers losing only one aircraft to the defending fighters.

 

4 September would prove to be a day of heavy losses for the Zerstörer, with both V.(Z)/LG1 and ZG76 featuring prominently. In the morning, attacks went in against the RAF's sector airfields, with a major strike developing around midday with aircraft factories as the target. Erpr.Gr.210, heading towards the English coast in the direction of Littlehampton, lost its second Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Hans von Boltenstern, when his fighter-bomber crashed into the Channel without apparently being the subject of any attack by enemy fighters. The unit pressed on and completed its attack on the Vickers Armstrong works at Weybridge, with V.(Z)/LG1, III./ZG76 and elements of ZG2 providing escort. The Bf-110 'Haifisch' fighters of II./ZG76 were tasked to provide fighter cover on the return flight to France. On this occasion the escort was not to be so fortunate, with RAF fighters putting up vigorous opposition to this particular incursion. 14.Staffelof V.(Z)/LG1 lost three aircraft while 15.Staffel lost one with another damaged in combat. Two further officers were removed from the Luftwaffe Zerstörer lists with the loss of Oblt. Michel Junge, Staffelkapitän of 14.Staffel, and Lt. Hans-Heinz Braukmeier of the same Staffel. III./ZG76 suffered heavily losing six fighters, counting Oblt. Helmut Florenz (Gruppe Nachrichtensoffizief), Oblt. Walter Schiller, Oblt. Hans Munich and Oblt. Kurt Raetsch among their losses. II./ZG76 had three Bf-110’s shot down, being those of Oblt. Hermann Weeber (Gruppenadjutant), Oblt. Ernst-Hartmann Freiherrvon Schlotheim and Oblt. Gunther Piduhn, with another force-landing at Boulogne. ZG2 lost one aircraft, but it was that Bf-110 of the Geschwaderkommodore, coded 3M+AA, flown by the Geschwaderadjutant, Oblt. Wilhelm Schaefer. ZG2's Kommodore, Obstlt. Friedrich Vollbracht, had asked Schaefer to fly this mission in his stead, and once airborne, Schaefer was less than impressed to find that the engines were performing at nowhere near normal efficiency. The Bf-110 became, in effect, a 'sitting duck' to the aggressive RAF fighters that singled it out for attention.

 

On this occasion the Zerstörer had suffered heavily at the hands of RAF fighters, losing 15 in combat. With another two 100 per cent losses on non-combat flights the total losses for the day were 17. This level could not be sustained.

 

5 September saw no losses, but on 6 September Erpr.Gr.210 returned to the target of two days before, the Vickers Armstrong works at Weybridge. Once again the unit suffered the loss of one Bf-110, a 1.Staffel machine. On this day, ZG26 also lost Bf-110’s: Oblt. Friedrich Viertel, Geschwader Technical Officer, survived into captivity after being shot down into the Channel, while 3. and 7.Staffeln each lost one Bf-110. The following day, the Luftwaffe would change objectives and turn its attention to the city of London, to the relief of the RAF's High Command and the benefit of its fighter airfields.

 

With a change in strategy on 7 September, the RAF was initially caught on the wrong foot. The further anticipated raids on airfields did not materialise, the first main raiding force ignoring the beneath them and instead heading straight for London. Pitching close on 1,000 aircraft into the first major raid on London, Zerstörer from ZG2, ZG76 and III./ZG26 formed part of this large armada. Set against them were 16 RAF squadrons. As the RAF progressively entered the fray, so the Zerstörer began to take losses. The unit most grievously hit was ZG2, which lost seven Bf-110’s. Notable among their losses was the fact that six of the seven pilots were officers: Oblt. Gerhard Granz (Gruppenadjutant of I. Gruppe); Lt. Dietrich Kislinger of 3.Staffel; Lt. Kurt Schunemann (Technical Officer of II.Gruppe); Lt. Hans Dietrich Albert and Lt. Karl Stix of 4.Staffel and Oblt. Willi Brede of 6.Staffel. Over a period of weeks ZG2 had suffered repeated heavy losses, and its effectiveness as a cohesive fighting unit was now at an end. The final loss of one aircraft and one damaged in action on 11 September marks the point by which the RAF had effectively put the unit out of the Battle. Reconnaissance units suffered one Bf-110 lost in action and two others damaged on 7 September. Far from the perceived weakening of the RAF fighter force, a view which gathered momentum in the last days of August and early days of September, the RAF appeared to be as strong as it was at t